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Britain

Respect conference: a setback and an opportunity

Socialist Resistance

The second annual conference of Respect took place on the weekend of the 19 and 20 of November in London. There were 350 delegates (based on 1-10) and 50-100 visitors and observers. Socialist Resistance (SR) had 12 delegates from local Respect branches and intervened into the conference around the issues of civil liberties, the defence of the Health Service and education, LGBT rights and the building of Respect - key debate at the conference. SR held a very successful fringe meeting on the Saturday evening to discuss the debates at the conference.

Socialist Resistance remains fully committed to building Respect, since it is the best thing to happen on the left in England for a long time. The conference, however, was a deeply worrying event. It unfortunately put a question mark over Respect’s long-term development as a broad based alternative to new Labour and its neo-liberal agenda. It questioned Respect’s ability to develop as a genuinely pluralist organisation capable of embracing the bulk of the left in this country. It was a sharp reminder that Respect only has a future as an open pluralist organisation, in which the bulk of the left can feel comfortable and play a role.

This was a serious problem. It should have been a conference which summed up the undoubtedly successes of the past year and mapped the way forward. How to recruit new members and integrate them for the long term. How to develop Respect - as John Rees, Respect’s National Secretary and leading member of the SWP, had argued - as a “mass membership party”. How to consolidate the strong areas and build the weaker ones. How to bring other sections of the left into Respect. How to develop effective local branches in as many places as possible. How to develop Respect as an organisation which can function with elected representatives both in Parliament and in local government. How to be seen as the anti-war party, but not only as an anti-war party.

The conference needed to discuss how to locate Respect firmly in the emerging campaigns against the new neo-liberal offensive of the Blair government. How to confront the assault on civil liberties which is taking place. Indeed the conference adopted excellent resolutions on these issues - on the NHS, education, and pensions. It had an important debate on climate change. It adopted a strong statement on the war in Iraq and supported the upcoming peace conference.

It adopted a series of excellent resolutions on the war (introduced by writer Haifa Zangana), the defence of civil liberties (introduced by Paddy Hill one of the six people wrongly jailed for 16 years after the Birmingham pub bombings in 1974), and opposition to the anti-terror legislation currently going through Parliament - though this was marred by the failure of the conference to oppose the Incitement to Racial and Religious Hatred Bill. This Bill is currently going through Parliament and would extend the currently existing blasphemy laws. The SWP has supported this law and argued for it inside Respect.

It was also regrettable that the resolution, supported by several Respect branches, which called for Respect’s existing policy in support for LGBT rights to be included in future election manifestos (it was controversially not included in the manifesto for the general election), was caricatured in the debate as islamophobic when neither the mover nor the resolution mentioned Islam.

The resolution was adopted but it is hard to see why it is such a sensitive subject. LGBT rights are mainstream issues across the spectrum of progressive opinion and Respect must reflect this.

It was in the session on building Respect, however, which was opened by Colin Fox of the SSP - the key session of the conference as far as Respect’s future development is concerned - where the main problems arose.

Faced by a clutch of resolutions aimed at developing Respect as an organisation - resolutions calling for better administration, better democratic functioning, better contact with members and branches, more collective policy discussions and Respect’s own publication - John Rees and George Galloway (Respect’s MP) responded negatively with demagogic speeches and crude appeals to loyalty. Some resolutions were opposed, others were not, but the tone of the debate was that they were either unnecessary or placing unreasonable demands on Respect’s resources.

This created a contradictory situation. The conference passed a number of important resolutions on building Respect but the rhetoric from leading members was to the effect that these would be a low priority.

In his introduction to this session John Rees berated the conference saying that it was not a matter of minutes and reports it was a matter of political leadership - and he and others were giving it. With George Galloway he and had given it in the anti-war movement and they and others were giving it in Respect. He gave a list of examples of political leadership he and others had initiated since the formation of the anti-war movement. He said that if Respect wanted him to sit in the office behind a computer it would have to find another national secretary.

Of course we all want Respect to have an effective, proactive and campaigning leadership. We all want a leadership that responds to political developments as they take place. But it has to be a leadership based on the collective development of policy by Respect’s membership and elected committees as a whole, not one based on individual leadership initiatives with the rest expected to follow without question.

Behind all this of course is the debate as to whether Respect should develop as a party or a loose coalition - and the more structures it has the more it takes on the character of a party. But there is no avoiding this if Respect is to develop as an effective and democratic organisation.

If it is going to challenge for political power at national and local level taking on all other political parties and dealing with all the problems that will arise in the course of this, it has to be able to effectively organise its work and develop its line. It has to ensure that its membership feel included. It has to have its own political life separate from its participating organisations. It doesn’t matter what it is called but it cannot avoid taking on the character of a political party.

Other left parties from across Europe were invited and spoke at the conference - the RC from Italy, the Left Block from Portugal, the Left Party from Germany and the SSP from Scotland. They are not all called parties but they all organise themselves as it they are.

Unfortunately a decision appears to have been taken by George Galloway and the SWP to defend the loose coalition model and ensure that development of party structures go thus far and no further. This imposes a narrow organisational framework that is not a viable model for an organisation which challenges for political power on the full spectrum of political issues.
Nor is it working: despite the important successes Respect has had Respect remains organisationally weak with a great diversity between it branches as far as their numerical strength and political viability is concerned. Yet there was no attendance of this from the leading figures, the conference was urged to look only at the achievements and not at the problems.

Alan Thornett, a members of the Respect National Council and a leading members of Socialist Resistance (moving the Southwark resolution) argued that whilst the gains Respect had made in the general election were extremely important we had to take a much more sober view of the development of Respect since then. This had been a period of great opportunity yet the membership has remained the same and no new sections of the left has joined. Some Respect branches are strong, others weak and struggling. Unless we recognised this and got to grips with it Respect would run into serious problems.

The discussion from the floor on building Respect was dominated by supporters of John Rees’s position. Speaker after speaker demanded that Respect have an internal regime that, frankly, would not be tolerated in any union. No need to waste time on minutes, communicating with branches and poring over policy. All we need is to intervene spontaneously into and build the latest campaign and bring the Respect message.

George Galloway’s close-of-conference speech continued on this theme - despite the fact that the debate had been closed and the votes taken. He said that what John Rees had said had been “brilliant”. There was simply not the money, or staff in the Respect office, to implement the proposals being made. He said he had always been against Respect having a newspaper and he was even more against it now. Respect was not a party, he said, but a coalition and that is the way it should stay. If Respect had a newspaper people would fall out over Cuba or what should stay. If Respect had a newspaper and he was even more against it. Respect was dominated by supporters of the Soviet Union had been. No one had remotely suggested anything like this as content for a paper.

George Galloway referred directly to a point raised in Socialist Resistance broadsheet, that Respect has not increased its membership of 4,000 since the general election, nor brought in any new sections of the existing left. In this he even managed to argue that the size of Respect’s membership does not matter.

It is votes which count he said: “it is better to have 4,000 members and 250,000 votes than 10,000 members and 100,000 votes”. “We are doing well,” he told the conference “enjoy”. All this was a dangerous cover up of the inability of Respect to recruit or broaden itself out to wider sections of the anti-war movement and the left. The idea that a small, narrowly based party can command big votes on a long-term basis is completely false.

Galloway argued that the old language of the left needs to be discarded. Indeed it should. And the first thing we should junk is browbeating speeches about how the leaders are doing a good job and the job of everyone else is to get behind them. SWP members applauded all this to the rafters. Even worse it has since emerged that some SWP members who had voted for various resolutions in their local Respect branches switched votes and opposed them in the conference without any discussion with their delegation. It is impossible to build a local branch on that basis.

In responding to these developments we need to re-affirm the importance of the Respect project and continue the fight to build it. It is the only show in town. If the Respect project fountered it would be a major loss to the left from which it would take a long time to recover. We urge anyone proposing to leave Respect to stay in it and help build it on the basis of the decisions of the conference and to fight to change it where necessary.

Despite some important resolutions on building Respect being voted down and the inference in George Galloway’s closing speech that those adopted would be given a low priority a number of important resolutions were adopted which if properly implemented could take Respect forward and build on its achievements.

The Southwark resolution argues that Respect has to be built as a mass membership organisation in which all members feel they have a role to play in developing the life of the organisation. This means building a much stronger national profile for Respect at both the political and organisational level.

A series of practical measures were adopted which are listed below.

* The implementation of these resolutions would go a long way to improving the administration and collective development of Respect and improve its chances of bringing in other sections of the left and the trade union movement.
* As the Camden and Barnet resolution said: “It is vital for our development into a mass party that we are recognised as the most democratic, transparent and pluralist organisation within the wider labour movement”.

**Practical measures adopted by conference for building Respect**

- Urging local branches develop strong and regular campaigning activities.
- Making Respect as open and inclusive as possible in order to encourage recruitment and keep and consolidate the new members.
- Making a fresh approach to those sections of the left, including the trade union left, which are not currently in Respect.
- Strengthen our political profile at national level by producing further editions of the successful Respect tabloid paper.
- Seeking to strengthen the national office and press and publicity profile between elections.
- Building strong local branches which develop their own political life and culture through regular discussion and debate.
- The National Council should convene consultative groups on specific areas of policy, such as housing, health, transport, drugs, civil liberties etc. drawing on the expertise and specialist knowledge of interested members and supporters of Respect in order to develop policy papers for discussion by the National Council and the party at large and to produce fact sheets and campaign materials for use by party members.
- The National Council should establish (or encourage the establishment of) special interest groups for members involved in specific areas of work, such as a Respect teachers’ group, a Respect health workers’ group and so on.
- That the National Secretary should circulate reports on the business conducted at meetings of the National Council; as soon as is practically possible after those meetings.
- The National Council meetings should be open to branch observers.
- Mechanisms should be developed to encourage and facilitate the flow of information both between branches and between individual members with common areas of interest. For example, the Respect website should, as part of a wider upgrade, include a bulletin section accessible only to members - a feature widely used by other membership organisations.
- The publication of a general Respect manifesto which can be available for sale and on the website.

**Socialist Resistance** is a socialist newspaper produced by British supporters of the Fourth International in conjunction with other marxists.
Iraq

"Strategic Redeployment" vs. "Out Now"

Gilbert Achcar, Stephen R Shalom

Whatever the limitations of Rep. Murtha’s call to redeploy U.S. troops from Iraq that we have already emphasized ("On John Murtha’s Position," ZNet, Nov. 21), he went much too far for most Democrats or for the Bush administration. Nevertheless, there have been others who have urged the redeploying of some of the U.S. forces in Iraq.

In October, Lawrence Korb and Brian Katulis, writing for the Center for American Progress, a liberal organization headed by Clinton’s former chief of staff John Podesta, issued a report calling for what they termed "strategic redeployment." (Lawrence J. Korb and Brian Katulis, Strategic Redeployment: A Progressive Plan for Iraq and the Struggle Against Violent Extremists, Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, October 2005.) Like Murtha, Korb and Katulis (who served in the Reagan and Clinton administrations, respectively) make telling observations. For example, they note that:

"most Iraqis do not want us there and they do not feel our presence makes them safer. One half says they support insurgent attacks on coalition forces and a majority says they feel less safe when foreign troops patrol their neighborhoods, according to polling of Iraqi citizens sponsored by the US government earlier this year."

They conclude, however, that what is needed is a "strategic redeployment," specifically rejecting "calls for an immediate and complete withdrawal." Under their proposal, during 2006, 46,000 national guard and reserves would be returned to the United States, 20,000 troops would be sent to other theaters (18,000 to Afghanistan, 1,000 to Southeast Asia, and 1,000 to Africa), and 14,000 troops would be stationed in Kuwait and off-shore in the Persian Gulf. The 60,000 U.S. troops remaining in Iraq would be redeployed away from urban areas to minimize inflaming Iraqi opinion. By the end of 2007, most of these troops would be withdrawn (to unspecified locations), leaving only "counterterrorist units."

"This presence, along with the forces in Kuwait and at sea in the Persian Gulf area will be sufficient to conduct strikes coordinated with Iraqi forces against any terrorist camps and enclaves that may emerge and deal with any major external threats to Iraq."

Some analysts (for example, Slate’s Fred Kaplan) have suggested that Murtha got his plan from Korb and Katulis, though he speeds up their timetable and moves his entire residual force out of Iraq. But the same reasons given in our original essay for why the anti-war movement should avoid confusing Murtha’s position with its own apply with even greater force to the Korb-Katulis position. Korb and Katulis wisely point out that to enhance U.S. security President Bush should announce that the United States "will not build permanent military bases in Iraq, counteracting arguments made in recruitment pitches by militants and Iraqi insurgents." But where are the U.S. counterterrorist units in Iraq going to be housed if not at bases?

In any event, it’s not just designs on military bases that need to be disavowed, but plans to dominate Iraqi oil too, which are proceeding apace. (See Greg Muttitt, Crude Designs: The Rip-Off of Iraq’s Oil Wealth, London: PLATFORM with Global Policy Forum, Institute for Policy Studies [New Internationalism Project], New Economics Foundation, Oil Change International and War on Want, November 2005.) And a two-year timetable is unacceptable. As we noted earlier, two to three months is plenty of time to remove all U.S. troops, if that is one’s genuine interest. Protracted "timetables" only make sense if one is trying to secure a continuing dominance over Iraqi politics and resources before leaving.

In the Washington Post of November 26, Joe Biden of Delaware, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and an aspiring presidential candidate, wrote an oped column entitled "Time for An Iraq Timetable." Biden declared that in 2006 U.S. troops "will begin to leave in large numbers. By the end of the year, we will have redeployed about 50,000. In 2007, a significant number of the remaining 100,000 will follow. A small force will stay behind — in Iraq or across the border — to strike at any concentration of terrorists."

Biden’s language is interesting — he doesn’t quite call for this, but essentially predicts it. His prediction seems to be based on the fact that the Senate by a vote of 79-19 and over the objections of the White House adopted an amendment requiring the President to provide quarterly reports on the progress of U.S. policy and military operations in Iraq. (This vote took place after the Senate defeated a Democratic-sponsored amendment asking the president to prepare an estimated timetable for withdrawal from Iraq.) Given that the successful amendment has no teeth at all, it’s hard to see why it presages much of anything.

Nevertheless, Biden’s comment is consistent with various hints from the Bush administration itself. Obviously the Republicans don’t want to go into the 2006 elections, let alone the 2008 elections with an increasingly unpopular and seemingly endless occupation of Iraq on display.

In part this leads them to make optimistic comments about how soon Washington will be able to reduce the number of troops in Iraq (glossing over the fact that several thousand troops were added before the October 15 referendum, so a withdrawal of these would indicate no progress at all). During the Vietnam War there were countless optimistic predictions of when the troops would come home, only to have the president send more troops when the situation deteriorated further. And we’ve been hearing similar optimistic comments from the Bush administration for more than two years; for example, on October 19, 2003, the Washington Post reported on its front page:

"There are now 130,000 U.S. troops in Iraq. The plan to cut that number is well..."
advanced... and has been described in broad outline to Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld but has not yet been approved by him. It would begin to draw down forces next spring, cutting the number of troops to fewer than 100,000 by next summer and then to 50,000 by mid-2005, officials involved in the planning said."

True, in 2003 Iraq was nowhere near the political liability for the Bush administration that it is now, so we shouldn’t discount the prospect of a real policy shift. Clearly the Bush administration has scaled back its more grandiose goals in Iraq, but it’s unlikely that it would choose to withdraw its forces without being confident that it could secure its more basic goal — domination of the oil resources of the region — unless, of course, this were made untenable.

It is possible that the U.S. will fall back on a strategy of trying to replace its troops with air power, hoping that the reduction in U.S. casualties will make the war more palatable to the American public. In late August, the head of the air force told the New York Times that after any withdrawal of U.S. ground troops, "we will continue with a rotational presence of some type in that area more or less indefinitely," adding "We have interests in that part of the world...." (Eric Schmitt, "U.S. General Says Iraqis Will Need Longtime Support From Air Force," Aug. 30) To support these interests Washington is upgrading 16 different bases in the Middle East and Southwest Asia (New York Times, Sept. 18, 2005).

According to Seymour Hersh in the Dec. 5 New Yorker, plans are being drawn up precisely to replace U.S. ground troops in Iraq with warplanes. Hersh reports that some Pentagon officials are worried about what it would mean to have Iraqis calling in bombing targets to the U.S. air force, but no matter who calls in the coordinates, white phosphorus, cluster munitions, and 500-pound bombs are not going to address the problem of the insurgency; indeed, they are going to generate more recruits for both the insurgency and terrorism.

For the anti-war movement, it is critical to insist on the complete withdrawal of U.S. and coalition forces, from Iraq and from the region, because retaining any of them — whether counterinsurgency units ready to intervene or air power to level further Iraqi cities — will violate Iraqi sovereignty and continue to fuel insurgency and hatred. And the anti-war movement must insist as well on immediate withdrawal, because the Bush administration itself will soon be talking of future drawdowns — and indeed it already is.

We should bear in mind that the mere fact that the antiwar movement raises the "Out Now" slogan does not mean that U.S. forces are going to leave Iraq overnight. During the Vietnam War, a much more powerful movement than anything we have seen in the U.S. in the last few decades demanded that U.S. troops get "Out Now."

This did not lead — even when the U.S. power elite reached the conclusion that the war should be terminated — to a "precipitous" withdrawal, but to a withdrawal that was completed only after the Paris Accords were concluded with the three main Vietnamese parties involved. Nevertheless, the pressure of the antiwar movement in the U.S. was decisive in compelling Washington to opt for this withdrawal.

The issue with "Out Now" is therefore not about the logistical details of withdrawal, but about how to be most effective in countering Washington’s imperial aims. "Out Now" is a slogan around which one can build a large coalition of forces, from those who only care about "our boys" to those who care about the Iraqi people’s freedom, whereas any dilution of the "responsible exit strategy" kind — aside from the fact that it would be extremely difficult even to agree on what the "conditions" for the withdrawal should be — would only provide the Bush administration, along with pro-war Democrats, an argument for justifying the protracted presence of U.S. troops.

We are not calling for a "cut and run" withdrawal, abandoning Iraq to its fate (like in the "selfish" nationalist rhetoric of the isolationist Right). We are perfectly aware that, given what the United States has been doing in Iraq, tragically disrupting the situation in that country, if the U.S. troops were just to leave Iraq suddenly, say in 48 hours, without prior notice, that would definitely create a dangerous chaotic situation. But this is not what we are demanding.

The demand for the immediate withdrawal of the troops is, first of all, a demand for an immediate political decision to withdraw the troops. Once the political decision is taken and proclaimed publicly, it becomes possible, in fact indispensable, to prepare the best conditions for its implementation in the shortest possible timeframe, while starting without delay to bring troops back home. To be sure, the modalities through which this should be completed in a way not to harm the Iraqi people must be worked out with their elected representatives.

If Washington were to make clear that it wants to complete the withdrawal of its troops within a timetable stretching over weeks, or very few months, this would provide a very powerful incentive for the Iraqis to reach an agreement among themselves on a way to run their country together peacefully and start to concentrate their efforts on the huge task of its reconstruction.

The consensus reached at the recent Cairo conference is an important step in that direction and proves that it is perfectly possible, and much easier indeed, to reach such agreements when U.S. representatives are not there constantly interfering and calling the shots.

Finally, those who accuse the antiwar movement of wanting to "cut and run" and pretend that they care more for the interests of the Iraqis — whereas most of them are actually worried about U.S. imperial interests — would be better advised to demand that the U.S. respect Iraqi sovereignty over Iraqi natural resources and reconstruction.

For our part, we believe that there is a moral obligation for the U.S. government to pay reparations to the Iraqi people for all that they have suffered as a consequence of U.S. criminal policies — from the deliberate destruction of Iraq’s infrastructure in the 1991 war to the devastation brought by the present invasion and occupation, through the green light given to the Ba’athist regime to crush the mass insurrections of March 1991 and, above all, the murderous embargo inflicted on the Iraqi population from 1991 to 2003.

The withdrawal of U.S. and coalition forces, the end of U.S. economic domination, and the payment of reparations: this is the way to truly serve the principles of justice, as well as the best interests of the people of Iraq and the U.S. population.

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Mexico - The ‘Other Campaign’

The Zapatista Approach to Politics
Interview with Sergio Rodriguez
Miguel Romero

The Sixth Declaration of the Selva Lacandona, published by the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) in June of this year, has had an enormous impact in Mexico. An original experience has emerged from it, the “Otra Campaña” (Other Campaign), which has radically changed the situation of the Mexican political and social left and is mobilizing and organizing thousands of people, especially youth.

Miguel Romero talked to Sergio Rodriguez, director of the Zapatista magazine “Rebeldía” (www.rebeldia.org) on these subjects that merit the attention of the left internationally.

INTRODUCTION BY MIGUEL ROMERO

In the interview references appear to concrete facts of the Zapatista experience. We will summarize them very succinctly. Ample information on all these subjects can be found on the website of “Rebeldía” and the EZLN www.fzln.org.mx, including the Sixth Declaration and the activities of the Otra Campaña.

The San Andrés Accords were signed between the Mexican government and the EZLN in February 1996 and contained the fundamental demands to provide a democratic solution to the oppression of the indigenous peoples.

Later the Commission of Reconciliation and Participation of the Mexican Congress, made up of deputies representing the PRI, PAN, PRD and PT [1] drew up the so-called Ley Cocopa or Indigenous Law; the EZLN supported this law to the extent that it embodied the fundamental points of the Agreements of San Andrés. Finally, the government and the Mexican Congress betrayed their commitments.

The March for Indigenous Dignity was called by the EZLN in December 2000 and traversed Mexico until April 2001.

In August 2003, the EZLN decreed the creation of the Juntas de Buen Gobierno (“Assemblies of Good Government”) in five territories under their control, which came to be called “caracoles”.

The Assemblies are made up of indigenous civilians elected by their communities. They work in parallel to the official city councils, but with complete autonomy with respect to the government of the State of Chiapas.

Interview

Miguel Romero: The objective of this interview is to understand better the experience of the social and political movement that has arisen from the Sixth Declaration of the Selva Lacandona and that is being constituted around the Otra Campaña. Unlike what was the case some years ago, I believe that very little is known on the European left about what is happening here.

And from what I see and hear, is important to make it known, so that interest in Zapatismo revives if, as I think, it has declined. Let’s begin then. It will be clearest if we follow a chronological order. So we begin with the “Red Alert” of June 19 this year, the call of the EZLN, that initially caused alarm, because it seemed the signal of an imminent military attack from the Mexican Army, and, frankly, met with disagreement from some, among whom I count myself.

Sergio Rodriguez: In some senses, the Red Alert represented the culmination of three years of debates in the Zapatista communities on the conclusion of the March for Indigenous Dignity of early 2001 and what should be the new initiative. The constitution of the Assemblies of Good Government in August 2003 was a first stage, to consolidate strength in their territory.

But, as always, Zapatismo wants to go further and so the idea has arisen of culminating the process of consultation in the communities. Normally, they [interviewer’s note - Sergio habitually talks about the EZLN as “they”, probably to avoid any misinterpretation of his opinions as a “spokesperson”; but it is clear that he does not feel in any way exterior to “them”) consulted across the communities; now it is decided that the communities name their representatives who go directly to a meeting, which will debate and vote on the Sixth Declaration of the Selva Lacandona.

Then the Red Alert was proclaimed to guarantee the security of the meeting, the Zapatista Army must stay on alert: that was the meaning of the Red Alert. When the meeting finished, it was lifted.

The Sixth Declaration is not presented as a political turn, but at least subjects are considered that were not previously part of the discourse of the EZLN.

In your opinion, why did it arise at this moment and what is its fundamental content?

First it should be said is that it is a political turn. There is a substantial change both in the subject which this
declaration is addressed and the subject which justifies it. It is a founding proposal that is no longer directed fundamentally to the indigenous peoples, like the San Andrés Accords, or to a somewhat amorphous civil society, nor is simply for including a series of provisions in the Mexican Constitution, it has another, different, objective.

Once one’s own spaces of autonomy are consolidated, with the Assemblies of Good Government, it is important to create a national perspective, to catalyse a process that exists in the country, with a new element, which is the Otra Campaña. It is a political, not an ideological, change.

The Sixth Declaration speaks of an anti-capitalist, anti-neoliberal programme, of a new constituent process, in the sense, not so much legal, but of a “new country”... But by the form in which things are being developed, it seems that the main target is the construction of a new social and political movement, the generation of a autonomous movement independent of the policy of the Mexican state and its institutions.

What emerges as a programme will be the result of a long process. A second fundamental point is that the process is directed to foment, to dynamicize a space in which people can develop, to construct mechanisms of self-organization. That is not because they did not exist before. Until a few months ago, people said that, outside Chiapas, there were no processes of social self-organization in Mexico. What we have seen in the meetings of the Otra Campaña is that there are very deep processes of self-organization, that were submerged, that had emerged in the uprising of 1994, but that were not visible, and that have now come to light.

There are two related points of a practical character in the Sixth Declaration that I would like you to expand upon. The first is the survey as method of work: what is set out initially is not a program, not even in its more elementary aspects, but to go and ask the people “from below” what are their concerns, proposals, hopes, and so on.

The second is how the Otra Campaña, from the first moment, and although it is not explicit, sets out to construct a movement. Just now a group of university students came to see you to say they wanted to join the campaign and they asked you to organize a meeting to talk about what they could do; that is no longer a survey, it is the organization of a movement...

These things will certainly emerge in practice. But I believe that the two activities that you have named are different. They say to the people that they are going to listen and they fulfil that commitment, although has given rise to marathon meetings of up to 36 hours listening to the people who came to the forest; but of this we will speak more later.

So the first commitment is that the EZLN listens. In addition, they recommend this as method, listening to what people say. Who does the diagnosis of what is happening in a specific place? In the first place the very people who live there. This has to do with one’s own experience: in the origins of the EZLN, when they arrived in the communities, first they wanted to speak, to propose a program, a military-political conception and they hit against a wall, dialogue was not possible.

When they managed to make contact with some people from the communities they said to them: “It is you that have first to listen, and you can act on the basis of what you have heard”. They like to speak of “ways”, they say for example that it took ten years to understand the “indigenous way”, so now it is necessary to understand the “ways” of the different social movements and to create the space for dialogue. But one is not a passive listener. One has to listen and to construct.

Before it was said: “advance while questioning”. Now it is “advance while listening”.

Let’s return to the order of events. The Sixth Declaration is addressed to the political left, the social communities, movements, NGOs and so on, it proposes they go to Chiapas to listen and to be listened to, and this amazing march is generated to Chiapas of hundreds of people, in some cases travelling thousands of kilometres... Describe how the process has happened.

After the proclamation of the Sixth Declaration, a kind of work plan was developed, that included the holding of six specific meetings: with political, indigenous, social, collective and non-governmental organizations, individuals and the sixth with what they call “others”, that is to say, those for any reason not included in the previous meetings or unable to attend them, Finally there was a plenary.

Altogether 6,500 people went to the meetings and the number does not reveal much of the magnitude of the process, because you have to consider that Chiapas is in a corner of the country; for a student in Chihuahua to arrive at the meeting place meant crossing the whole country in a journey of several days. The first meeting was with the political forces, 34 organizations and about 220 people came.

There are three forms of approach to the problem were expressed. On the one hand, there were those that knew clearly that the Sixth Declaration opened a new political space for them and did not have ideological problems with it, considering that it did not prevent their process of construction, because nobody has been asked to dissolve or limit their political or ideological positions.

Another sector considers that the Otra Campaña requires an electoral definition, not by voting in favour of the PRD but by constructing an electoral alternative. This reflects a broad debate in Mexico; the polls give Marcos between 18 and 21% in terms of electoral support. Particularly, these figures were circulated to denigrate the EZ, showing that it has no chance of winning the elections. But they have had a boomerang effect, because many people think that, without any campaign, to have 18-21% is a lot and propose to participate in the elections.

And a third sector says to the EZLN that the Otra Campaña, the mobilizations and so on are good, but that now the important thing is that Lopez Obrador wins and, in addition, to organize an independent social force to force Lopez Obrador to fulfill his commitments in the interests of the people. The comrades of the EZLN made an initial speech and a closing speech...

They only spoke at the beginning and at the end?

Yes. They were there listening, taking notes...

How long did the meeting last?

The one with the political organizations lasted from 9 am Saturday morning to 1am Sunday, with a rest to eat. This was the briefest one, because there were only 36 speakers. Let me say an important thing before dealing with the meeting. The place in which the meetings were held had a great meaning. This time it was not a zone of political and cultural interchange, like the Aguascalientes, in which the communities do not live.

This time they decided to hold the meetings in “reclaimed estates” that were in the hands of racist ranches - the worst ones, those that hung the Indians - they were “reclaimed” by the EZLN from January 1, 1994 and they have always stayed under their control, in spite of interventions from the Army.

What they wanted to symbolize with the choice of this place was, I think, three key ideas: first that the Salinas reform that privatised land in the early 1990s had not worked; second that the dynamic of action and struggle finally gained partial victories, as opposed to “ultimatist” visions of the process of social struggle, and three, that nevertheless all that is at risk, because it is not possible that the caracoles and the assemblies of good government coexist in the long term with neoliberal domination.
They wanted to send these three messages to the left organizations. And they concluded by saying: “For this reason we are rendering a tribute to the militant tradition of the Mexican left that is here, because beyond political, programmatic or other errors, you continue insisting on a direction that breaks with neoliberalism”. In the presentation of the meeting, Marcos raised a position without ambiguity opposed to any support for the candidacy of Lopez Obrador.

At the end, they requested a time, of one hour more or less to prepare their answer. In this, they indicated, among other points, that nobody is requesting an electoral message from them now, because that is not the sense of the Otra Campaña.

It can have in it people who support Lopez Obrador in the electoral area, but they are asked not to take up this theme in the activities of the Otra Campaña, exactly to avoid the EZ entering the debate, which would harm the fundamental process of work. Sure, on the following day what the media emphasized was the Marcos-Lopez Obrador confrontation. The newspaper “La Jornada” even attributed to Marcos the expression: “Either they are with me or they are against me”. A completely invented phrase.

One of the organizations which attended the meeting was the Frente Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (FZLN) [2]. What is the present role of this organization? Seen from outside it is a mystery: it appeared with great strength, seemed to be a fundamental political support for the EZLN; but since nothing is known of it, what it does, what it says... *

Well, I believe that the FZLN has sometimes been judged harshly. Remember the conditions in which it was created, on the eve of the signature of the Agreements of San Andrés, in 1996, the Fourth Declaration of Selva Lacandona was published and there was the approval of the Indigenous Law in the Chamber of Deputies.

Then it was said that the FZLN was going to be the “airport” in which the “airplane” of the EZLN would land later. But once it was clear that the government and the parties were going to betray their word, the EZLN sent a letter to the congress of foundation of the FZLN in which it allowed it freedom to decide its future. It is easy to understand that it is very different for the FZLN to consider itself as airport for the EZLN or as an independent organization.

A process began then which was long, complicated, contradictory, but very interesting. They started from an idea very different from the EZLN: they wanted to have the smallest possible media projection. For that reason, there have been important processes of struggles in which the FZLN has had an outstanding participation, but without appearing publicly.

Today we have an organization which is already consolidated in most of the national territory, where you have about 800 militants who work regularly... ...more than most of the left organizations who went to Chiapas...

By far. And more also as far as territorial extension goes. It is an organization of very young people; as 75% are under 30s. People very influenced by the uprising of 1994, that were adolescents then, participated in caravans of peace, aid campaigns, that were promoting health, education and so on, who really had that original experience in politics. The other 25% come from different organizations from the Mexican left.

Good, let’s return to the meetings.

To take up where we left off, subcomandante Marcos announced that he had asked the magazine “Rebeldía” to be part of the process of organization of the Otra Campaña. Before the beginning of each meeting we wrote to the attending groups and we asked them if they wanted participant or observer status.

Many of them also adhere to the Otra Campaña, or they constitute a collective; unitary platforms and fronts between unions and other organizations were constituted; it is an important subject of debate how the Otra Campaña relates to these type of initiatives that arise independently within it.

In the meetings, everybody has the same speaking rights. The magazine has the obligation to make a kind of record of all the interventions, present it to it the comrades who spoke so that they verify if they recognise the fundamentals of their intervention; without their agreement, it is not published. Once we have agreement, the record is sent to all those who until then had signed the Sixth Declaration and we set up the website of the Otra Campaña, so that anyone can have access, whether participating or not in the Otra Campaña.

The second meeting was with the indigenous peoples. It was very touching, because it was the first encounter after the March for Indigenous Dignity of 2001. There were some who said: “we have fought struggles without receiving the support of the EZLN”. And the EZLN recognized the error and said that the Otra Campaña tried to respond to those problems and to see how we can defend everyone from of all the attacks that we receive from the Mexican State.

There were nearly sixty delegations of indigenous peoples, among them those of greater weight, and even some that are migrants within the country, and have begun to organize, for example in the capital; these by the way have suffered terrible aggression and violence against them from the government of the capital that Lopez Obrador presides over.

The third was with social organizations and representatives came from 120 organizations of the Popular Urban Movement, feminist organizations not linked with the lines of “empowerment”, that is that are not in situation of dependency on the regime, lesbian, homosexual organizations... There were many people from unions, metalworkers, electricians, oil, from Secretary Generals or representatives of executives to representatives of union currents and workers’ collectives who had come together in a workplace to integrate themselves in the Otra Campaña: it is important to emphasize this because until now the union organizations had hardly participated in the Zapatista meetings. Here there were very diverse debates, from critics of those policies of “empowerment”, to proposals of concrete demands...

In this meeting, the EZLN insisted more on the idea of “listening”. We can say that each meeting had an outstanding particular meaning. In the first, the political definition with respect to the elections. In the second, the commitment to indigenous autonomy. In the third, it was “we are going to listen”.

Because many people saw the Otra Campaña as a similar initiative to the March for Indigenous Dignity, which was a spectacular mass action, which, for example, attracted many more people in the cities than Lopez Obrador is attracting in his electoral campaign now. Now it is clarified that we are not talking about big rallies, big actions, but dialogue from below, speaking with people. It is not going to be then a media initiative, but destined to construct from below the
networks of linking, interchange, debates... between diverse sectors, diverse sensibilities

And in this meeting already there would be many people...

Yes, 900 people. The arrival of all these people has already been an adventure as you can imagine. The comrades had constructed shelters so that people could sleep under cover, but the calculations were exceeded; at the first 100 people were expected and 220 arrived; at the second they expected 300 and 500 came; at the third, 500 expected and 900 came.

And beyond the EZLN commanders, the 900 listened to all the debates?

I won’t say 900, but at least 700 listened to the whole meeting. There were no small groups commenting, at the margin of the meeting. And those who spoke, whatever they said, were applauded equally, even if they had said the opposite to the previous speaker.

It is not strange to me; one of the good, and enviable surprises that I have had is that the debates are very clear, and sometimes very strong, but people can express themselves without problems, says what they say, and the debate does not jeopardize common action.

That’s the process. The fourth meeting was the most representative of the effect of Zapatismo in Mexican society. Not so much by NGOs, although also they had a role, like the groups. 1,200 people attended and about 200 groups and NGOs. This meeting was very youthful. Of those 1,200, at least 900 were young, from 14 or 15 to early 20s.

Many came from an experience of organization and struggle, against repression, or from alternative culture, rock singers, some very well known, sang... because everyone could intervene in their own way, singing, speaking, dancing, making a play, a performance, or whatever, whenever it had to do with the subject. This was the meeting that lasted longest because it began on Saturday at 9 am and finished on Sunday at 6 pm, with a break to sleep from 4am to 9am on Sunday morning.

All this time was devoted to listening, listening and listening. And the last one was that of the “others”. Then there was the plenary in Aguascalientes, on September 16-18. We registered 2,160 people, but there were many more, because the registry queues were enormous and many people did not register. We made a direct transmission by Internet, and received many commentaries on line. The minutes of the meeting occupy more than 200 pages and can be consulted on the Internet.

We are going to try to emphasize some points. I imagine that at some time you will publish a synthesis document and we do not have space now for an exhaustive summary.

I agree. One first important question is that it was decided not to vote on anything. The Sixth Declaration, plus all the proposals presented will be debated by groups, organizations, individuals... As a result of debate, we will establish where there is agreement and where there are divergences that will continue to be discussed. Yes, the national tour with the subcomandante was decided on, the dates, mechanisms of coordination... But the political content remains open...

Yes, I believe that there was a consensus that the political content can remain open for a long time and they will be defined within the framework of activity.

But there is a common basic political content, isn’t there? Anti-capitalism, anti-neoliberalism, total autonomy with respect to the Mexican political institutions...

That’s right, that is what is noticeable in the Sixth Declaration.

And now we pass to another stage centred, if I understand properly, in the national tour of the subcomandante to the communities, popular neighbourhoods, organizations and so on. The idea of this tour continues being “to listen”?

Yes, but obviously there will be dialogue, and forms of coordination will be sought.

The idea of coordinating this process can be considered something already settled. Everybody that it is in the Otra Campaña thinks that they are participating somehow in the organization of a movement.

Indeed that is a general conviction. The form, the mechanisms can be diverse. Many raised the point that in some states a state coordination could be constructed. It can be, but in others it will not be possible and it will be necessary to have municipal, or sectoral, coordinations.

Will the tour of Marcos happen before the electoral campaign?

In parallel, during the first half of the next year, until June 26, one week before the elections. The insurgent lieutenant colonel Moisés said at the end of the plenary: “OK, we give you the subcomandante”, symbolizing that the EZLN remains in Chiapas and the subcomandante goes to the Otra Campaña. There is a calendar that includes the 31 states of the country and the capital, five or six days in each place, mainly in closed meetings, not in public meetings, although we can have them, interchanges of experience.

Then the process of evaluation, discussion and so on will come. We will not accept any economic aid for the campaign. Zapatismo has counted on much aid from national and international networks. But now they have decided said: “we are going to walk on our own feet”. The communities can continue receiving aid. But the Otra Campaña, no. If people want Marcos to go somewhere, they should arrange his travel, his accommodation... which also contributes to organizing the campaign.

We spoke before of how the Otra Campaña could be understood as a “Literacy Campaign” in reverse, in which the people “from below” do not wait to become literate, but which they are going to be in a certain way the “literacy teachers”. Marcos would be then like a kind of channel...

I use the formula of “catalyst”: of experiences, of processes, social dynamics that already exist. Marcos and the EZLN have from the beginning said something important: “we are not going to meet just anybody, but with the people who are struggling and want to organize themselves somehow”. Marcos is a tool that the EZLN has given the campaign: not a leader, nor a coordinator, but a tool to facilitate so that people can bring their ideas to the process of coordination, their experiences or their form of confrontation with the regime.

There is a problem that surely that you have considered, but that I have not completely understood. A campaign so extended that it lasts until 2007 will be a campaign conditioned by important events, both in the world and in Mexico, it does not occur in a space autonomous of social and political reality. All these events will affect the campaign and will create a problem of definition. Does the campaign have any mechanism which allows you to respond to this problem?

First, a fundamental question: the process does not finish in 2006. A second very important phase is already planned which will begin on January 1, 2007. As of that day, the command of the EZLN, many militia members, bases of support, and so on will leave Chiapas, not to make a tour, but to remain in a region, in a state, for at least a year; soon it will be seen if they remain there or they march to another place and are replaced by other comrades.

But there will be time to continue speaking of this. As far as mechanisms for expressing opinions are concerned, on the one hand positions are already being prepared on concrete subjects. For example, Fox has introduced a bill in parliament to privatise energy. So a document is being prepared on this. Or on the privatisation of pensions.

We will seek common declarations on precise aspects in which a clear agreement can be obtained. And each organization or movement, and also the EZLN, has the full right to make their
own political declarations. In addition, there is an instrument of interchange, the plenaries, that can become a vehicle of opinion, if we participate with dynamism, with energy...

But when is the next plenary? When it is necessary, perhaps very soon, perhaps not. But rather than with fixed plenaries, they will be based on events, but knowing that the plenaries do not solve the problems of decision taking by themselves and it is very complicated to bring together so many people.

There are an enormous amount of opinions on every point, very different, and some have an impact on others, so there are agreements, debates... Everything is very rich, but very complex. And we cannot forget that we are in an electoral year. It is possible that Lopez Obrador will win and the PRD, that is a party that we can consider as leftist in its origins. And there are people who have expectations in this possible victory. We have to see how the electoral process goes to analyse what pressure will exist on the Otra Campaña.

As for me, I believe that what is going to be defined on the electoral terrain is very little: I do not see why it is necessary to choose between a imbecile from PAN and the conservative populism which is what Lopez Obrador really represents. I believe that since it has been decided to leave people to vote as they want next July 2, this has opened the pressure valve and this problem will not fundamentally affect the Otra Campaña.

We have to finish. All that you have just said confirms to me the reasons why I wanted to do this interview, that is, the conviction that your experience is exciting in a world in which it has become almost impossible to get passionate about what passes for politics. What you are doing is very specific and it would be absurd to try to export it. But I believe that you are the only current with a broad political influence that takes the oft-invoked theme of "another way of doing politics" seriously. So we have much of which to speak.

And much to discuss. It has always seemed me that the good thing about Zapatismo is that it does not give you a model, but that, on the contrary, it forces you to face complicated and necessary problems, that is, you complicate life. And so I want to turn things around towards you: are you influenced or affected by what happens outside Mexico?

What complicates life for you? In the Sixth Declaration there are very fraternal and solidarity phrases towards the alternative left worldwide, towards Venezuela, Cuba... But I have the sensation that, beyond solidarity, what happens in the world has little influence on the EZLN, be it the crisis of the PT, or the evolution of Rifondazione in Italy, or the experience of the factories expropriated in Argentina, or the next meeting of the WTO and so on. I don't know, I see the EZLN as very much in solidarity, but very distant from what happens in the world.

I don't see it that way. I believe that, in fact, Zapatismo breaks with a utilitarian vision of the European left which has predominated on the Latin American left. Fausto Bertinotti told me that when he went to the Lacandona forest he said to Marcos: "I do not come to make a gesture of solidarity with Zapatismo, I come to discuss politics with Zapatismo". And Marcos replied: "Finally".

Because indeed that political discussion is very important. Zapatismo maintains a close relationship with solidarity bodies, but it goes beyond simply a solidarity question. The Encounters for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism reflected that will and that vocation.

Beyond the fact that they concretely occurred, they reflected another way to understand international relations with respect to the Latin American left then grouped in the Forum of Sao Paulo, already in crisis. It is necessary to also consider that they say that on many international issues they are very ignorant and that produces prudence.

But for example, the Iraq war has been key for the EZLN. It had a tremendous importance because then it made contact with many people who were in the anti-war movement in Europe and in the USA. It is the only time that the EZLN has signed an international manifesto, the one initiated by Chomsky in the USA. I believe that sometimes the non-participation of Zapatismo in international forums is misinterpreted.

It can give the impression of superiority, but I rather see it as an example of prudence and modesty. In the Sixth Declaration the international content is greater than on other occasions. The possibility of a new international encounter is also spoken of. And in the Otra Campaña the international question is very present. We are going to see how things develop in practice.

How many people do you think are participating now in the Otra Campaña?

I calculate that from August to now it's 45,000 people.

Well done! Good health and good luck, brother.

This interview, conducted in Mexico DF on October 6, 2005, was published in “Viento Sur” number 83.

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NOTES

[1] The PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) has dominated Mexico for 70 years, imposing a system of corrupt clientelism; the PAN (National Action Party) is a neoliberal party of the big bourgeoisie, which profited from the crisis of the PRI regime to win the presidency in 2000; the PRD (Democratic Revolutionary Party) emerged from a split from the PRI in the late 1980s, when the PRI regime began its neoliberal turn; the PT (Party of Labour) is a small party which has for a long time oscillated in the orbit of the PRI.

[2] Since this interview, the EZLN has announced the decision to dissolve the FZLN.
The fate of revolution in the 20th Century

Stalinism and Bolshevism
Daniel Bensaïd

The following essay by Daniel Bensaïd represents a critical re-evaluation of Trotsky’s well-known pamphlet Stalinism and Bolshevism (1937) [1]. It was written for the magazine Erre, published by supporters of the Fourth International in Italy.

There is a current fashion for roots and biblical genealogies: Hegel begat Marx, who begat Lenin, who begat Stalin... Those who are the most erudite go back as far as St. Paul or Plato. Real history and its social tissue disappear in these self-generating concepts. So the upheavals in this world are “Rousseau’s fault” or “Plato’s fault”. Thus, by established descent, the Stalinist dictatorship is the allegedly logical continuation and the legitimate heir of the October Revolution, its mechanical and ineluctable consequence.

Adapted to today’s fashionable thinking by the “historians” of the Black Book of Communism [2] and by repentant Stalinists like Annie Kriegel or Francois Furet, the refrain is nothing new, presenting Stalinism as the natural and legitimate offspring of Bolshevism.

In 1937, when Trotsky wrote this text “all reactionaries, Stalin himself, the Mensheviks, the anarchists and certain left doctrinaires” claimed that it was the case. This linear and fatalist conception of history recognizes neither leaps nor breaks nor choices of which road to take. It is simply a new theodicy of the spirit: the germ of all future developments was already contained in the initial idea that governs the world. Thus, the identification, pure and simple, of Bolshevism, of October, and of the Soviet state replaces the historical process of the class struggle on an international scale by a simple “evolution of Bolshevism in a vacuum”.

When Trotsky, exiled in Coyoacan, made this point, it was a time when darkness was falling. The predicted future war was already casting its shadow over an obscure present [3]. After the second Moscow Trial came the trial of Tukhachevsky and the generals. The Barcelona Commune had just been crushed by the Stalinists. The news of Andreu Nin’s assassination had just been confirmed.

In April, the former organizer of the Red Army received the commission presided over by the philosopher John Dewey, to refute the lies of the Stalinist trials. He was now busy assembling the material for his dossier on “Stalin’s Crimes”. In his eyes, this battle was just as important as the days of insurrection or the civil war. What was involved was nothing less than preserving a memory that was threatened with being effaced by lies and falsifications, in the same way as people suddenly disappeared from official photographs [4].

After a year’s work, the commission made public, at a press conference held in New York on September 14th, 1937, the results of its enquiry, presented in a 600-page volume. It described the Moscow trials as “falsifications” and declared Trotsky and Sedov (his son) “not guilty”. On learning the news, Trotsky cried out “Two lines! But two lines that will weigh heavily in the library of humanity”.

We can understand from this reaction the importance that he then attached to this battle for memory, because there was no guarantee that the falsifications would not impose themselves as historical truth. Since then, they have been more than unmasked. That is not the least of the posthumous victories of the victims of Stalin, of the purges, and of the Gulag.

The epoch of bureaucratic heroism

The opposite of a revolution
But in 1937, no one could know where the tragic spiral was going to end, the spiral of those “great political defeats”, which, wrote Trotsky, on the first page of his pamphlet “inevitably provoke a reconsideration of values” in two opposing directions: an enrichment in the light of experience or a regression towards old ideas on the pretext of inventing “new truths”.

The victory of Nazism in Germany, the defeat of the Spanish Revolution, the rise of the bureaucratic reaction in the Soviet Union, demanded in the middle of the 1930s a critical examination of the theoretical and moral heritage. The unfolding of the “short 20th century”, the collapse of the so-called socialist camp, the neoliberal counter-reform begun in the 1980s, today require us to examine our consciences even more thoroughly.

But this self-examination does not start from nothing. It can, very fortunately, draw strength from the controversies and
the combats of yesterday. In reality, if symbolically the fall of the Berlin wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union mark the end of the historical cycle opened by the Great War of 1914-18, and by the October Revolution, the defeat of the great hopes of emancipation doesn’t date from 1989 or 1991. That was only the second death of a corpse. Because already, a long time before, an interminable Thermidor had devoured the revolution.

How long ago exactly? That’s the whole question. A litigious and controversial question. Many sincere communist militants have obstinately denied the fact of a bureaucratic counterrevolution on the pretext that they didn’t find an event with a capital ‘e’ which was the perfect symmetry of October, the clear reversal of the process of which it was the initial act, a strict return to what existed before.

That is in reality an illusory search. More perceptive, the reactionary ideologue Joseph de Maistre had understood following the French Revolution, that the counterrevolution is not “a revolution in the opposite direction”, but the “opposite of a revolution”, a reaction that is rampant, asymmetrical, advancing in stages, sometimes pausing.

It is in this sense that the analogy with Thermidor, used by oppositionists in the Soviet Union from the 1920s onwards, was perhaps more pertinent than they themselves had imagined: a reaction which is not a reversal of time, a return to the past, but the invention of unforeseen historical forms.

In 1937 Trotsky was convinced that this bureaucratic counterrevolution had triumphed. The disastrous policy of the Communist International faced with the rise of Nazism and in the Spanish Civil War were proof of this, and even more so was its incapacity to draw the lessons of these catastrophes, other than the zigzag between the line of sectarian division of the “third period” and the line of subordination to bourgeois institution and allies in the framework of the popular fronts.

In the Soviet Union itself, forced collectivization had provoked the great famines and the mass deportations of 1932-33. The Soviet law of 1st December 1934 had legalized the emergency procedures of the Great Terror and of the great purge of 1936-38, the number of whose victims is estimated at 690,000. With the crushing of the urban and rural popular movements, this bureaucratic terror liquidated what was left of the heritage of October, cutting deeply into the ranks of the party and the army. Most of the leaders of the revolutionary period were deported or executed. More than half of the 1900 delegates to the Congress of Victors of 1934 were eliminated in the space of a few months. Of the 200 members of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, there were only three survivors. The arrests in the army struck more than 30,000 cadres out of the 178,000.

Parallel to this, the administrative apparatus required for the undertaking of imposing this repressive regime and for the running of a brutally nationalized economy, exploded. According to the archives analyzed by the historian Moshe Lewin, the number of administrative personnel went in the space of 10 years from 1,450,000 in 1928 to 7,500,000 in 1939, and the total number of white collar workers rose from 3,900,000 to 13,800,000. The bureaucracy thus became a real, crystalized social force with its own interests.

A Bureaucratic Thermidor

In the 1930s however, this analysis was not easy to accept for communist militants who saw in the Soviet Union the strongest rampart against the rise of Nazism and who were marked by the hard battles conducted in the period of the line of “class against class” or by the heroic exploits of the international brigades in Spain. Unlike Social Democracy, whose bureaucratic degeneration occurred in the form of parliamentary bureaucratization, the bureaucratic degeneration of the Communist International was masked by the rhetoric of the “defence of the Soviet Union”. This is the epoch that Isaac Deutscher pertinently defined as the time of “bureaucratized heroism” to which the accounts of Anna Larina Bukharina, of Victor Serge, of Jan Valtin, of Alexander Zimin and of so many others bear poignant witness.

However, each in their own way, authors as different as Walter Benjamin (in his conversations with Brecht) or Hannah Arendt (in the Origins of Totalitarianism) have discovered the same point of historical inflection. This judgement has been largely confirmed by more recent historical work, such as that of Moshe Lewin, Eric Hobsbawm, or Pierre Broué, who have discovered the same point of historical inflection. This judgement has been largely confirmed by more recent historical work, such as that of Moshe Lewin, Eric Hobsbawm, or Pierre Broué, taking advantage of the opening of the Soviet archives (see in particular The Soviet Century by Moshe Lewin, 2003). In the course of the decade of the 1930s, Soviet society underwent a thoroughgoing metamorphosis under the bureaucratic knout. No country in the world had previously experienced such a rapid transformation, carried out by the iron fist of an autocratic bureaucracy.

The recent memory of Brezhnevite stagnation or the senility of Chernenko leave the impression of an immobile conservatism, whereas the rising bureaucracy was on the contrary brutally dynamic and enterprising. From 1926-30 to 1930 the cities grew by 30 million inhabitants. Their population went from 18% to 33% of the total population. Under the first five year plan, the rate of growth was 44%, as much as during the whole period from 1897 to 1926. The waged labour force rose from 10 to 22 million workers.

The result was a “massive ruralsisation” of the cities, which became an enormous site for the spread of literacy and education, the imposition of work discipline by a forced march, the exaltation of nationalism and the rewarding of careerism, the crystallization of a new bureaucratic conformism. In this great hurly-burly, as Moshe Lewin ironically remarks, society had almost become the famous “classless society”, not because class relations had withered away, but because all the classes were “shapeless and in fusion”.

What was then taking place was not the personal rivalries which so enrapture our medias today, it was not the outcome of a “match between Stalin and Trotsky” but really “an antagonism between the bureaucracy and the proletariat”, a confrontation “between two worlds, two programmes, two moralities”, expressed by strategically opposed positions on the Chinese Revolution, on how to fight fascism, on the orientation of the Soviet economy, on the Spanish Civil War, on the coming war.

Trotsky and the left oppositionists abundantly used the analogy with Thermidor to describe the process of bureaucratic counterrevolution. They wished in this way to underline that Thermidor was not a restoration, a return to the ancien regime, but a counterrevolution in the revolution: the empire that resulted thus appeared as a grey zone where revolutionary aspirations were still tangled up with the consolidation of a new order of class rule. Chateaubriand’s Mémoires d’Outre-tombe perfectly illustrates the pertinence of the analogy. We clearly find in Stalin the characteristic traits of the Thermidorian parvenu, a sort of more mediocre Napoleon. Both of them rose on the receding revolutionary wave, on the suppression of the earlier aspirations for emancipation, even though they spread certain of the effects of these aspirations in spite of themselves: “That Bonaparte, continuing the successes of the Republic, sowed everywhere the principle of independence, that his victories helped loosen the links between peoples and kings, tore these peoples free from the power of old customs and old ideas: that in this sense he pursued social liberation, all that I can in no way contest: but that of his own will, he consciously worked for the political and
civil liberation of nations; that he established the most narrow despotism with the idea of giving Europe, and France in particular, the broadest constitution; that he was only a tribune disguised as a tyrant, that is a supposition that it is impossible for me to adopt: the revolution, which was Napoléon’s source, soon appeared to him as an enemy; he fought it ceaselessly” [5]. Like him, Stalin could have said: “I have conjured away the terrible spirit of novelty which was bestriding the world”.

So Thermidor was not the restoration. But the restoration followed Thermidor, just as in Russia the liberal restoration succeeded the bureaucratic Thermidor. But the restoration, that sinister epoch where the names of Robespierre, Marat, Saint-Just, could not be pronounced, only lasted for a time.

The (Original) Sin of Statism?

In his pamphlet, Trotsky polemicised against the anarchist thesis according to which the evils of Stalinism came from a defect of statism that was part of the Marxist programme. It is however enough to re-read the criticism by Marx and Engels of the programmes of Gotha and Erfurt, or State and Revolution, written hastily by Lenin in the middle of the revolutionary torment, to see that the problem lies not in the theory, but in very concrete social contradictions.

Do we really need to remind people that Marx conducted a polemic on two fronts, against the illusions in the social struggle that led the anarchists to misunderstand the specificity of political struggle, but also against the statist socialism of Lassalle.

And although he opposed the abstract negation of the state and of all authority by Bakunin, it was in order to oppose this with the theme of the “withering away” or “extinction” of the state as a separate and fetishised body, insisting on the historical conditions of such a withering away. It was in reality not a question of proclaiming this, but of attaining the real conditions for it: a massive reduction of forced working time, the socialization of administrative functions, a radical transformation of the social division of labour and of the relations between town and country, etc.

All these things cannot be done in a day by waving a magic wand: taking power is an act, an event, a moment of decision and of truth; it is only the means and the beginning of a process of permanent revolution. The other aspect of the polemic with Bakunin, which is too often forgotten, concerned democracy: the rejection of all authority, including the authority of a majority decision, in the name of freedom of the individual or of active minorities, implies at the end of the day the rejection of any democratic constraint [6]

As for Lenin, State and Revolution is a text of a libertarian communist tone which puts the emphasis on the destruction of the old bureaucratic state machine and on all the emerging forms of self emancipation. Trotsky recalled that in this perspective, Lenin had envisaged leaving some territory for the anarchists to conduct their community experiments.

If there was a theoretical error, it lies rather in the libertarian excesses of this text and in its optimism concerning the rhythms of the predicted withering away of political and juridical institutions. Certainly this vision was counting on the rapid extension of the revolution in Europe, but it omitted to think about the institutional and juridical forms necessary for the period of transition. Thus, the founding texts of the first four congresses of the Communist International or the 1921 trade union debate demonstrate an insufficient clarification of the relations between the state, the soviets, the parties and the unions.

While indicating his “full agreement” with the anarchists “in regard to the final goal of the liquidation of the state”, Trotsky drew the lessons of this experience, further enriched by the experience of the Spanish Civil War and of the entry of the anarchists themselves into the government of Largo Caballero in the autumn of 1936: “The victory cannot be thought of as a single event: it must be considered in the perspective of a historic epoch”. So that, if it is “absolutely undeniable” that “the domination of a single party served as the juridical point of departure for the totalitarian Stalinist system (...) the reason for this development” was not consubstantial with Bolshevism, and “to deduce Stalinism from Bolshevism is exactly the same thing as to deduct, in a larger sense, counterrevolution from revolution”.

On the other hand, the conception of the party and its vanguard role was still problematic in 1937. Trotsky underlined then that “the prohibition of the other Soviet parties...did not flow from any ‘theory’ of Bolshevism”, but was a measure of defence of a revolution which, although “signalling a tremendous danger” was imposed to defend the revolution in a situation of civil war. However, the problem remains: the victory in this internal war against the Whites and their international allies led in 1921 to the New Economic Policy, aimed at getting an exhausted country back on its feet; it was not associated with a democratic opening on the political level, an opening that was all the more necessary because “the culture of war” was the crucible of a bureaucratic brutality which the national question, among others, revealed to Lenin in the last months of his active life [7].

In 1927 the question of multi-partyism did not appear in the platform of the United Opposition. In 1935, however, having measured the consequences, Trotsky made a principle of it in The Revolution Betrayed and explained the fundamental reasons for it: “In reality, classes are heterogeneous; they are torn by inner antagonisms, and arrive at the solution of common problems not otherwise than through an inner struggle of tendencies”. He thus broke clearly with the illusion of the homogeneity of the people which had dogged the revolutionary movement since the French revolution. And he converged with the historic warning launched in 1918 by Rosa Luxembourg: “Without general elections, an unhindered press and freedom of assembly, the free struggle of opinion, life in any public institution dies off, vegetates and the bureaucracy remains the only active element”.

However his formulations on the role of the party remain quite ambiguous: “The proletariat can take power only through its vanguard [...] The proletarian revolution and dictatorship are the work of the whole class, but only under the leadership of the vanguard. The soviets are only the organized form of the tie between the vanguard and the class. A revolutionary can be given to this form only by the party”. It is one thing to say that we have not up to now seen a victorious revolution without the intervention of a revolutionary party (whatever its name: movement, front, etc.). It is another thing to say that the proletariat can only come to power through its vanguard, if that means that it will exercise power by delegating it to this vanguard. What is then involved is the substitution, under cover of organically adequate representation, of the party for the class.

The probability of such an interpretation is reinforced by the following sentence. If the Soviets “are only the organized form of the tie between the vanguard and the class”, they are not the sovereign organ of a new power that is destined to wither away, but the simple mediation between a class that is a minor and the party which incarnates the fullness of its delegated consciousness. The exception imposed by the civil war then seriously risks becoming the rule, to the detriment of self-emancipation.

A Premature Revolution?

Trotsky also undertakes to refute criticisms on two fronts: the Menshevik (and reformist in general) thesis according to which the worm was in the
The Russian Revolution was thus condemned to monstrosity from the October insurrection onwards by a “premature” historical birth, whereas the “objective conditions” of going beyond capitalism did not yet exist: instead of having the wisdom to themselves limit their aims, the Bolshevik leaders were the evil geniuses of this fatal error. It is as if, between July and October 1917, as the war continued, what was involved was a rational choice about the right historical tempo, a reasoned choice between a civilised British-style parliamentarianism and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and not a desperate confrontation between revolution and counterrevolution.

Moshe Lewin reminds us, as did Trotsky in his History of the Russian Revolution, how the Cadets, the Mensheviks, and the whole democratic centre then collapsed under the weight of antagonisms that no one controlled. Every crisis offers a choice. In 1917, the bankruptcy of the Kerenskys, the Milutovs, the Tseretelis, laid bare the confrontation between the Kornilov reaction and Bolshevik revolution. Those were then the terms of the alternative. From a revolutionary point of view, wrote the great Soviet historian Mikhail Guefter, himself a victim of Stalinist repression, “there was no choice”: “Having thought a lot about this problem, I can allow myself a categorical answer.

What was accomplished was at that time the only solution opposed to a more bloody change and to a senseless debacle. The choice came afterwards, a choice involving not the social regime, not what historical road to follow, but a choice within this road.

There were neither different readings nor steps that had to be mounted in order to reach the summit, but a junction, a choice of roads” [8]. Blanqui would have said, a fork. And these choices of what road to take are visible. They are called the NEP, the end of the civil war, the German Revolution, forced collectivization, the struggle against Nazism, the Chinese Revolution, the Spanish Revolution...

The worst, in this way of reasoning about “history at a snail’s pace” is that these advisers of the 25th hour draw on their own cowardice and their own passivity to accuse of excessive haste those who accepted the challenges that were imposed by the situation. In reality the Bolsheviks were faced with the alternative: either revolutionary audacity or being crushed by the White reaction. But they situated this audacity within a strategic horizon that was European and international, staking everything on a rapid extension of the revolution in Germany and in the West, without which, as Trotsky again stressed, “Bolshevism will be liquidated” and the Soviet regime “left to itself will fall or degenerate”.

The social convulsions that followed the war in Austria, in Hungary, in Italy, in Germany, beyond, show that it wasn’t a question of unreasonable speculations, but a serious strategic hypothesis. Only historians of the accomplished fact and fatalist politicians claim that only what actually happened could happen. Amputating real life of its multiple possibilities, they deprive politics itself of any strategic dimension, reducing it to best to a pedagogical task and most often to a powerless administrative accomplishment of the “natural” course of events, as if history was a long tranquil river, flowing, with a just a few regrettable delays, in the direction of inevitable progress. It is this lullaby of the philosophies of history that Walter Benjamin denounced in his Theses on the Concept of History, rightly accusing it of having been partly responsible for the paralysis of the German proletariat in the face of the rise of Nazism.

The paradoxical thing, which was correctly noted by Trotsky, about this rhetoric of resignation, is that they attribute at the same time to the party the role of an all powerful demigod: passive and objectivist materialism on the one hand, subjectivism and idealism on the other.

Bolshevism thus becomes the black sheep, guilty of this whole historical tragedy. Trotsky underlines on the contrary that while considering the party as a very important factor in the struggle, indeed the decisive factor in a particular extreme conjuncture, a revolution remains the combination of many causes and factors. And “the conquest of power, important it may be in itself, by no means transforms the party into a sovereign ruler of the historical process”.

Contrary to what is often claimed, theory is not a determinist or teleological philosophy of history. If it is applied in order to understand the logics that are at work and the conditions in which what is possible would be either a revolution or a theological miracle, it does not claim to foresee the course of history, as classical physicists foresee the mechanical consequences of an initial cause. Gramsci was very wisely said that we can only foresee the struggle and not its outcome, which is by nature uncertain. All the more so as there is no revolution “just in time”, which arrives punctually at the appointed hour.

As Engels had already understood in his analysis of the revolution and the counterrevolution of 1848 in Germany, it is a question of the temporal dialectic of “already no longer” and “not yet”. While freely criticising certain aspects of the Russian revolution, including the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, Rosa Luxembourg paid the Bolsheviks the vibrant compliment of having “dared”, of having seized the right moment (the kairos of the Greeks) to make a historical choice. It is those who at the decisive moment didn’t dare that we should be calling to account. It is fashionable today to make revolutions responsible for all the catastrophes of the 20th century and to count their victims. But who can say what was the price of failed revolutions and betrayed revolutions and what was the responsibility of those who when it was time to take the risk, slipped away? Who can say how costly for Germany and for Europe were the consequences of the aborted revolution of 1918-23 [9]?

The Morals of History

To the moralists who deliver their lessons by denouncing “the immorality of Bolshevism”, Trotsky replied in his 1937 pamphlet that “the moral qualities of every party flow, in the last analysis, from the historical interests that it represents”.

But who determines and guarantees these interests? This temptation to ethical relativism has often been interpreted as a sort of vulgar Machiavellianism (or utilitarianism), according to which the end justifies all means. A year later, stimulated by his meeting with John Dewey, Trotsky came back to the question in a pamphlet that is often quoted, but not often read and badly understood, entitled Their Morals and Ours.

On the dialectic of ends and means, Trotsky is at the antipodes of a teleological justification: “if the end could justify the means we would have to look elsewhere for criteria for action: in heaven if not on earth! The theory of eternal morals cannot do without God. Absolute moral sense is only a timid pseudonym for God. It was the Jesuits
who argued that the means in itself is indifferent and that its justification is determined by the end pursued. In this they prove themselves superior to the hypocrisy of the Church.

But in becoming bureaucratized these warriors of the church became in their turn downright rascals": In another form, the utilitarianism of Stuart Mill morally justifies the means by the pursuit of the common good. In the same way, with our contemporary partisans of ethical or humanitarian wars, the purity of the intentions (the defence of the rights of man or humanitarian interference) justifies the most dubious means, the ethical ideal justifies the worst armed terror.

What justifies the end? asks Trotsky on the contrary. In reality, if morals do not come from heaven, if they are embedded in social relations, “the end also requires justification”. The vice is inherent in the formal separation between ends and means. What Nietzsche called bourgeois “moraline” thus becomes trapped in a logical impasse. Unlike readers who are in a hurry, Dewey very well understood Trotsky’s arguments on the interdependence of ends and means and he avoided accusing him of cynicism.

If the ultimate criterion of concrete morality was, as Trotsky affirmed, not even the interest of the proletariat, but the universal development of consciousness and of culture (of which the proletariat was only the particular mediation), in other words what frees a humanity that is really human from its religious and social alienation, then all means are not permitted, even to a revolutionary infidel.

But, objected Dewey, when Trotsky, believing that he was historicising moral judgement and eliminating any abstract transcendence, made the class struggle the deciding authority in questions of morality, wasn’t he transforming it, against his own intention, from a means among others into a supreme end? This well conducted controversy was unfortunately interrupted by the force of circumstances before Trotsky was able, as he had expressed the intention of doing, to follow it up.

The question of morality, like that of the revolution, presupposes the question of the dialectic, because if “Stalinism obviously came from Bolshevism, it did not come from it by virtue of formal logic but dialectically, not as its revolutionary affirmation, but as its Thermidorian negation”.

More generally, if revolutions are followed by counterrevolutions, it is not because these are genealogically engendered, but from irreconcilable antagonistic opposition. Ignorance of the dialectic or its significant transformation into a formal logic of state as Stalinist reaction carried the day, prevented analyzing together the event and its conditions, the revolutionary moment and the process of social and cultural transformation, historical necessity and political contingency, ends and means, history and memory, what is real and what is possible. That is why, as Lukacs had well understood, “really revolutionary thought is impossible without dialectics”, which is the very condition of any strategic thought and of a conception of history that is not positivist but strategic.

What is striking on re-reading the pamphlet Stalinism and Bolshevism in a quite different context, is the continuity of the terms of the polemic. To the crucial question that Mikhail Guefter asked again half a century later, whether there had been “a continuous march between October and the Gulag or if on the contrary was a question of two distinct political and moral worlds”, the study of the Stalinist counterrevolution gives a clear answer. Before the turning point of the 1930s, we can still speak of mistakes that could be corrected, of alternative orientations situated within the same perspective.

After that it is a question of antagonistic forces and projects which are totally opposed to each other. It is no longer a family quarrel which makes it possible to recover, a posteriori, yesterday’s victims as disappeared witnesses of a “communist plurality” or to reunite under the same banner the zeks and their executioners. As Guefter again wrote, a rigorous periodisation makes it possible for historical consciousness to “penetrate the field of politics”.

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NOTES
[1] This can be found in Writings of Leon Trotsky, 1936-37, Pathfinder Press, New York, 1970 and online at the Marxist Internet Archive.
[3] Trotsky had just written a long article entitled “On the threshold of a New World War” (Trotsky, op. cit).
[7] See the diary of Lenin’s secretaries and also Moshe Lewin, Lenin’s Last Struggle.
Bolivia

What will the victory of Morales mean?

The MAS at the threshold of power

Herve do Alto

Evo Morales, leader of the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS), won the December 18 presidential election with surprising ease. With 51% of the vote on the first round - more than 15% more than the polls predicted - Morales won outright on the first round. But what is the MAS? What does its victory mean?

The general elections of December 18th, 2005, was a result of a compromise between President Rodriguez and the social movements at the end of the crisis of May-June. Calling the election was key in getting the mobilizations called off.

They have now led to the victory of the president of the MAS-IPSP (Movement Towards Socialism-Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples), who embodies for many people the social struggles that the Republic has experienced since 2000 and the “water war” in Cochabamba.

If the victory of the MAS means the coming to power of a Left that has been excluded from it since the failure of the government of the UDP (Popular Democratic Union) faced with the economic crisis of 1985, it is nevertheless a Left whose background, sources, traditions and contemporary reality are complex and varied.

The MAS-IPSP, a party at the crossroads between the indigenous, left and nationalist traditions

The electoral successes of the MAS at the general elections of 2002, then at the municipal elections in 2004 (in spite of not winning control of any major city), although they expressed the undeniable popularity of Evo Morales, were also and above all the symbol of the irruption into the political field of a peasant and indigenous movement that is consolidating itself.

This movement, born at the beginning of the 1990s, is in a certain sense the result of a process of the creation of a “political instrument” that made possible the direct representation of Bolivian peasant and indigenous organisations [1].

The unions of coca growers, engaged since the end of the 1980s in a conflict with the Bolivian Army, which has the support of the American DEA (Drug enforcement Agency), were among its founders.

The aim of this “political instrument” is among other things, to favour a representation that is called “organic” of these union militants, through the collective adhesion of their organisations. The establishment of such a structural mechanism can be interpreted, in view of the history of this movement, as a double precaution. First of all in relation to the Katarist movement.

Katarism, in reference to the indigenous leader Tupac Katari who led an uprising around La Paz at the end of 19th century, is a current that contributed to the renewal of a peasant unionism that had up to then been allied to the military regimes. It leaders sought to fight against the cooptation of union leaders and to elaborate an Indianist ideology which they could use as a support for struggles.[2]. Initially a cultural movement which emerged at the beginning of the 1970s, whose main objective was to rehabilitate an indigenous identity that was perceived to be oppressed and denied.

The Katarist leaders, among them Genaro Flores and Victor Hugo Cardenas, succeeded in making peasant unionism a bastion of the resistance to the military dictatorships, whereas up till then it had been one of their most loyal supports [3]. However, after democratisation, the entry into politics of the Katarist leaders led to a continual division of this movement and only generated a long line of small, sectarian political parties, whose forces were infinitely smaller than those of the United Union Confederation of Working Peasants of Bolivia (CSUTCB). Ideologically influenced by Katarism, in particular in its defence of a multi-ethnic and multicultural Bolivia, the leaders of the MAS never ceased to consider this current as a negative example from the organisational point of view.

The other decisive factor was the desire to build up a relationship of forces with the Left, which saw and still sees the peasant movement as a stepping-stone to its own emancipation. This virtually systematic disdain for a movement considered to be incapable of leading the social struggles of the country is illustrated by the statutes, still in force, of the Bolivian Workers’ Confederation (COB), which attribute the leading role of the trade union entity to the miners, enthroned as the vanguard of the Bolivian proletariat (see the interview with Jaime Solares in this issue).

This is a paradox, when we know today that the miners, crushed by the neo-liberal reforms of 1985, have been reduced to a shadow of their former selves, while the peasants, reinforced numerically by the coca growers of whom many come from...the mines, have a representation within the COB that is inversely proportional to their weight in the political arena.

The virtual absence of a party apparatus, desired and theorised by the leaders of the “political instrument” in the name of the “organic” relations between the MAS and the organisations that are part of it, had however unexpected consequences on the social composition of the party and its leading bodies. As the general elections of 2002 approached [4] the lack of political cadres as well as the desire to attract the votes of the “urban middle classes” pushed Evo Morales in person to launch numerous invitations to intellectuals who came from the Left.

As a symbol, he chose Antonio Peredo, journalist and former Guevarist of the Communist Party, brother of Inti and Coco Peredo who had taken part in Che’s guerrilla movement, as candidate for the vice-presidency.

The success obtained in 2002 (the MAS won more than 20 per cent of the votes and 35 members of parliament, thus becoming the second biggest party in Bolivia) therefore had the unexpected consequence of pushing into prominence personalities from the classical Left, foreign to the indigenist currents, within a party which mixes together in an atypical way two political traditions that had up to then carefully maintained independence from each other.
These two traditions nevertheless remain solidly attached to each other by a strong nationalist feeling, born among the peasants from opposition to the interference of the United States in Bolivian political life in general, and on the question of coca in particular, and coming from the anti-imperialist tradition within the Left. In a certain fashion, the MAS took over the “revolutionary nationalism” that was defended for many years by the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) up until its conversion to neoliberalism in 1985, while expressing Katarist and to a lesser extent, Marxist ideas [5].

**The social movements are still divided as the elections approach**

Despite the preponderant weight of the MAS in the field of left politics, the Bolivian social movement remains strongly divided, in particular because of corporatist logics linked to local issues, and some of them sometimes appear to be radically critical of the party of Evo Morales.

However, it is the unity of the social movements, through the signing of a pact of revolutionary unity regrouping the MAS, the Pachakutik Indigenous Movement (MIP), the COB, the two CSUTCBs [6] and the organisations of El Alto, in March 2005, that was at the origin of the fall of the government of Carlos Mesa [7].

This unity quickly broke up, because of dissensions concerning the nationalisation of gas (the MAS was for a long time favourable to a “50-50” solution, before becoming a late convert to nationalisation) and from the traditional competition between leaderships that is so characteristic of Bolivian social movements.

To confront this problem, Evo Morales thought he had found the candidate who would make it possible to draw towards him the last movements who remained reticent, in the person of Alvaro Garcia Linera. This sociologist, who had become popular thanks in particular to his television appearances as a political analyst, is in fact a former comrade in struggle of Felipe Quispe, the leader of the Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army (EGTK).

Since then, he has basically confined himself to academic activities, while maintaining contacts with all the Bolivian social movements, without exception. When he agreed in mid-August to be the candidate of the MAS, it was with the ambition of regrouping on the same list, but behind Evo Morales, all the movements, with the aim of guaranteeing the broadest unity of the working-class, indigenous and intellectual Left.

Today this attempt by Alvaro Garcia and Evo Morales seems to have only half succeeded. The alliances achieved by the leadership of the MAS do in fact go beyond the traditional allies of the party: thus, among them we can count the Movement Without Fear (MSM) of the mayor of La Paz, Juan del Granado; many small left parties such as the Democratic Socialist Party (PSD) or the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Bolivia (PCMLB, Maoist) which has a base in El Alto, and working-class sectors like the Confederation of Pensioners of Bolivia, the National Confederation of Micro and Small Businessmen (CONAMYPE) and also the co-operativist miners (FENCOMIN).

However, although this electoral unity of the Left is undoubtedly the broadest since the unity achieved by the UDP in 1982, the most important social leaders have remained outside it. Felipe Quispe is standing again for the MIP, but without much hope of repeating the result he got in 2002, 6 per cent. The division of the CSUTCB seems to have considerably weakened it, and Roman Loayza now comes across as the legitimate leader of the peasants, including in the Altiplano that was traditionally loyal to the “Maliku” [8].

As for Jaime Solares, the executive secretary of the COB, he almost became the vice-presidential candidate of the MIP, but the risk of losing his position in the Confederation seems to have convinced him to change his mind. Furthermore, he seems to be aiming to build a “political instrument of the workers” attached to the COB and the workers’ movement, considering, following a very orthodox Marxist vision, that “the working class remains the only class capable of leading the Bolivian people towards its emancipation, not the peasantry” [9].

Both of them were approached by Alvaro Garcia to join the MAS lists. But the failure of such an alliance does not have the same causes according to each side. While Quispe and Solares stress the differences that were expressed during the May-June crisis, Garcia speaks of a simple problem of positions on the lists...A version that does after all remain quite credible, when you see how the negotiations with the Regional Workers’ Confederation (COR) and the Federation of Local Neighbourhood Committees (FEJUVE) of El Alto, which were largely commented on by the media, failed [10].

Whereas they almost stood for the party of Evo Morales, the leaders of the COR and the FEJUVE are now launching more and more criticisms of the MAS, reproaching it in particular with not according sufficient importance to the creation of a Constituent Assembly. This attitude is not understood on the side of the MAS, as the member of parliament and candidate Gustavo Torrico explains: “a law to convocate the Constituent Assembly that was drawn up by the present parliament would in all likelihood favour maintaining the presence of the most conservative sectors of society in the seats of power”.

The incessant criticisms against the MAS have even led certain leaders to relativise the opposition between Evo Morales and the candidates of the Right, Samuel Doria Medina (National Unity UN) and Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga (Democratic Social Power, PODEMOS), in this way giving the impression that the radicalism of their discourse is not necessarily followed up by a consistent attitude in practice. Such is the case of Edgar Patana, leader of the COR of El Alto, who will vote “neither for Tuto nor for Evo. Both of them will have to prove themselves”.

This position is not however shared by everyone, as is demonstrated by Jaime Solares, who, although not supporting Morales, nevertheless declares that “the main enemies of the Bolivian people are the neo-liberals and the pro-imperialists, represented by the candidacies of Doria Medina and ‘Tuto’ Quiroga”.

**An electoral programme with ambiguous outlines...**

If Alvaro Garcia failed somewhat in his attempt to win the favours of the leaders of the most significant social movements outside the MAS, on the other hand he succeeded in what was in a certain fashion the second objective of his candidacy: to involve the intellectuals and the “urban middle class” in the campaign of the MAS.

Around Alvaro Garcia a team of economists and sociologists has taken shape (Carlos Villegas, Juan Ramon Quintana, Elisebeth Salguero...) responsible for drawing up the most important parts of the MAS’s programme, under the leadership of the vice-presidential candidate. So although they are integrated into the working commissions on the programme, it is not the principal leaders of the party who have taken charge of this task.

Thus, the phenomenon of “delegation” of political work to individuals whose origins are foreign to the party, which was already present in 2002, seems to have become further accentuated on the occasion of this 2005 campaign. There are very few “organic intellectuals” who come from the peasant and indigenous movement.
On the other hand, the inflow of intellectuals, some coming from the Left like Alvaro Garcia, is tending to modify, sometimes substantially, the programmatic orientations of the MAS, often giving them a “technocratic touch”. We cannot however conclude that there is a kind of “sleight of hand” on the part of intellectuals who are taking over the party. It’s more a question of what you might call a “reciprocal exchange of legitimacies”: Evo Morales, who in his speeches, unconcealingly celebrates “the alliance between the peasants and the intellectuals” is trying in this way to make credible the perspective of a MAS government; for the intellectuals, it is a question of legitimising in the political field a learning that is often purely “technical”, because it is often disconnected, as a result of their own lack of militant experience, from any political involvement (in particular in the economic sphere).

The programme of the party takes up many of the aspirations of the majority of social movements: convocation of a Constituent Assembly, nationalisation of hydrocarbons and natural resources, defence and industrialisation of the coca leaf, definition of policies, national as well as foreign, independently of the United States (a demand that is expressed in the slogan: “nationalise the government!”). All of these are points that, as such, conflict with the interests of the North American neighbour, as they conflict with those of the multinationals involved in the business of gas, wood or water (in particular the French companies Total and Suez-Lyonnais des Eaux).

However, in spite of this apparent radicalism, the MAS is constantly, in the person of Alvaro Garcia, bringing nuances into the positions it takes and frequently proclaiming that no one need fear a Masista government, “except those who have really swindled the people”. This sometimes gave rise to tensions or misunderstandings in the MAS’s own campaign: while Morales was demonstrating against the ALCA (Free Trade Agreement of the Americas) alongside Hugo Chavez in Mar del Plata, Alvaro Garcia was explaining that that didn’t affect possible bilateral negotiations with the United States for a Free Trade treaty (TLC), a treaty that was desirable “as long as it does not infringe on the economic sovereignty of Bolivia” [11]. While Morales celebrates the fraternity that links him to Chavez or to Fidel Castro, Alvaro confesses his “admiration for European social democracy” and thinks that Venezuela, like “any other state, is above all seeking to satisfy its own interests in the framework of inter-state relations”.

So there is no “revolution” in view, nor very radical measures like a new agrarian reform or an ambitious programme of social aid, which could however seem to be “socially necessary” in a country where extreme poverty reigns. All the more so as Evo Morales has indicated that in spite of the mention in the programme of the repeal of supreme decree 21060, responsible for the massive privatisations of 1985, a Masista government would nevertheless begin to act with neo-liberal laws...

The main radical changes that the programme puts forward are above all in the sphere of production, through the rehabilitation of the state, whose role would be to coordinate the various platforms that comprise the Bolivian economy (large enterprises, communities and artisanal micro-enterprises), what Alvaro Garcia calls “Andean-Amazonian capitalism”, with the aim of producing a “productive shock” that would generate employment and wealth.

But in spite of the apparent moderation of the programme and the pledges constantly given to national and foreign capital by the presidential ticket, it would be a mistake to announce in advance a “Lula-type” scenario in Bolivia in the event of a victory of the MAS. Some questions, such as the depenalisation of coca that is proposed by Morales, in fact polarise the political landscape and push the US embassy to intervene, certainly discreetly, but effectively, in local political life, as was demonstrated recently by the “missile scandal” [12].

What is more, the polarisation that also intervenes at a regional level should not be without its effects on the MAS government, which, we can imagine, will quickly be forced to choose between Washington and the Caracas-Havana axis [13].

What seems sure today is that the Masista government, unlike the cases of Gutierrez or Lula, will have no respite either from its opposition or from the United States. For them, the victory for Evo is a nightmare, because it calls into question the roles of the US military-peace pact (PMC) which lead the union leaders to the regime of General Barrientos. The frustration engendered by the absence of a thorough agrarian reform after the 1952 revolution was one of the causes of this alliance, at first sight unexpected.

Thanks to the acquisition of the name “MAS”, recognised by the National Electoral Court, the IPSP was able to participate independently in elections from 2002 onwards, whereas it had previously had to resort to alliances with the left coalitions, in 1993 (with Eje Pachakutik) and in 1997 (with Izquierda Unida).


[6] The CSUTCB, led by Felipe Quispe since 1998, suffered a split - for which the members of the MAS were responsible - at its congress in Sucre in June 2003. There are now two peasant federations, one led by Quispe and under the influence of the MIP, the other, the majority, led by a MAS senator, Roman Loayza.

[7] See the article by Remberto Arias in this issue.

[8] The “Maliku”, which corresponds to a title in the Aymara communities, is the nickname of Felipe Quispe.

[9] See the interview with Jaime Solares in this issue.

[10] Close to Abel Mamanì, the secretary of the neighbourhood organisation, Alvaro Garcia hoped to make the El Alto leader the MAS’s candidate for prefect of La Paz. But the COR and the FEJUVE, adopting an intransigent attitude that has echoes of old practices, demanded the four single-member constituencies that make up El Alto, two multi-member constituencies (for one of which Edgar Patana, the leader of the COR, wanted to be candidate)
one senator, on top of the candidacy of Mamani for prefect. (See “Por sus alianzas, el MAS tiene problemas con sus candidatos”, La Razon, September 8th, 2005). Confronted with these demands, the MAS finally preferred to break off the negotiations, at the risk of seeing its support in the city somewhat eroded. [11] “El Estado es para hacerse amar, pero también para hacerse temer”, La Razon, November 11th, 2005.

[12] On November 18th, 2005, the newspaper Pulso revealed that 28 missiles belonging to the Bolivian Army, bought from China at the beginning of the 1990s, had been delivered in the greatest secrecy to the United States, supposedly to be destroyed because of their obsolete character, on the orders of the Rodriguez government.

After the president had denied having delivered the missiles to the North American neighbour, the Minister of Defence, Gonzalo Mendez, finally revealed that the newspaper’s version was true, justifying the decision with technical arguments that astonished specialists of the military institution. (See Abdel Padilla and Pablo Stefanoni, “Historia secreta de los misiles”, Pulso, November 18th, 2005; and A. Padilla and P. Stefanoni, “Operacion Camuflaje”, Pulso, November 25th, 2005). Apart from the fact that it tarnished the supposed neutrality of a Rodriguez government that finally was not content just to ensure a “smooth transition” until the elections, this scandal allows us to formulate a number of hypotheses as to what the United States and certain sectors of Bolivian society are ready to do to neutralise as far as possible a future government led by Evo Morales. [13] Although the way the recent Summit of the Americas at Mar del Plata in Argentina went, because of the attitude of Nestor Kirchner and Lula Da Silva, could lead us to moderate such a dichotomy. [14] Luis Tapia, “El Presidente colonial”, in Horizontes y limite des estadio y el poder, Muela del Diablo, La Paz, 2005, pp 77-110.

Bolivia
"I am the bad conscience of Evo Morales"
Interview with Felipe Quispe
Herve do Alto

Presidential candidate for the second time of the Pachakutik Indigenous Movement (MIP) of which he is the leader, Felipe Quispe was however in a more delicate position than in 2002. In spite of his charisma and his plain speaking, he no longer appeared to be capable of contesting the legitimacy of Evo Morales to speak in the name of the indigenous peoples of Bolivia, and received only a small number of votes. Nevertheless he remains a central figure in Bolivian political life.

Herve do Alto: What are your hopes for these 2005 general elections, considering that the polls are giving you a result greatly inferior to the 6 per cent that you won in 2002?
Felipe Quispe: In fact, the MIP has no economic resources. It is an indigenous, native organization whose only capital is the mobilization of its militants. So we don’t have campaign offices in the neighbourhoods like the other parties do.
In these conditions, to compete with the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS), Democratic and Social Power (PODEMOS) or the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) on a national level is for us mission impossible, all the more so as these parties respond to the interests of the multinationals and of imperialism. We are only the expression of the most oppressed, which doesn’t mean however that we start out as losers. We have good hopes of winning elected positions.

Has the division of the United Trade Union confederation of Working Peasants of Bolivia (CSUTCB) [1] affected your own public?
First of all, you have to remember that those who split the CSUTCB were the MAS. They have their own Movement of the Landless (MST-B) led by Moises Torres, their CSUTCB led by Roman Loayza…Evo Morales is waging war against me, because I am his bad conscience. As soon as he deviates from a line in defence of the peasants, I give him no peace.
He wants to physically eliminate the militants of eh MIP! For example, in this campaign, I can go anywhere in the country, except to Chapare [2] to which I am denied entry. We don’t do that. No militant of the MAS has been denied entry to the Altiplano, even to Achacachi [3].

Alvaro Garcia Linera, your former comrade in the Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army (EGTK) has however invited you on many occasions to join in the MAS’s project for these elections, hasn’t he?
Alvaro Garcia was indeed our comrade. He was even commander of the EGTK. Where have you seen a commander who betrayed his troops? Before the campaign, I asked him during a meeting if he wanted to be the MIP candidate for vice-president, or for parliament, and he refused. He said at that time that he wanted to be elected to the Constituent Assembly.
In the course of a subsequent meeting, he explained to us that in his opinion the MAS was going to win and that we had to join their lists, in the name of unity of the indigenous peoples, which we refused to do. I was in Venezuela when I learned that he was the candidate of the MAS. So he’s a traitor who had one foot in our camp, and one foot in the camp of the MAS, and he went where that suited him best. He’s a White, and like all the Whites in the past, he has betrayed our people.

You refused to ally with the MAS for these elections; however you did so in March 2005, by jointly signing the Pact of Revolutionary Unity against President Carlos Mesa.
That’s true, but this kind of conjunctural agreement, even between organisations which hate each other, is nothing unusual for us. When I came out of prison in 1997, they practically came looking for me the following year to put me at the head of the CSUTCB, a Confederation that was then divided between Evo Morales and Alejo Veliz [4].
I was a sort of referee, and I had to sign a secret pact with the two of them in order to be installed. We did indeed sign this pact in March, a pact that was anti-liberal, anti-imperialist and in favour of the nationalisation of hydrocarbons. But in the end it was the MAS that broke it! We have never been sectarian towards them, since we even supported Evo in

Felipe Quispe
I have to make one point clear here: this electoral campaign is for us a war that we are waging against all the candidates, including the MAS. Everyone is fighting to maintain and enlarge their own electorate. PODEMOS, for example, has the support of AND (Nationalist Democratic Action, the ex-party of Jorge Quiroga)...The MAS and ourselves, with similar electorates, are therefore also engaged in battle in this campaign. Having said that, we will see what we will do after December 18th. We will decide together in the MIP if we will or will not support Evo for the presidency, if ever we have members of parliament elected.

Furthermore, you have not hesitated to indirectly attack Evo Morales by declaring that you only defended the coca of the Yungas, and by openly suspecting the coca of Chapare of supplying the circuits of the drug trade. Is that something new in your discourse?

The coca of Chapare is worthless, no indigenous person chews it. In Chapare itself, the coca growers consume the coca of the Yungas, which tastes a thousand times better. So I’m just asking myself: if the coca of Chapare is unsuited to traditional consumption, what real use is it, if not for the drug trade? As for me, in any case, I will only defend the coca of the Yungas, which is the sacred leaf...

However, the Yungas is a historic bastion of the MAS...

That’s true, all the leaders belong to the MAS. But in the past, we were well established there, before becoming victims of a campaign of slander by this party, which spread rumours of corruption about us. We are nevertheless continuing to carry out work in this region, work that we could describe as clandestine, with a long-term perspective, with young leaders.

Why wasn’t the candidacy of Jaime Solares for vice-president confirmed?

We are politically close to Solares, there’s no doubt about that. But he is a leader who is permanently slandered and who has to face strong internal opposition within the COB (Bolivian Workers’ Confederation) itself.

In fact, he didn’t have many people behind him. The COB should have had the responsibility of organising the campaign in the departments of Beni and Pando, but the departmental confederations (CODs) didn’t want to do anything. Without militants from his side, such an alliance was becoming difficult and we preferred to go it alone. Having said that, I think that with Solares, we’ve only put things off till later.

Do you hope to bounce back by taking the leadership of social mobilisations in the event of a MAS government?

I don’t really see the situation like that. I think rather that the MAS will want to neutralise us or even kill us. Alvaro Garcia knows us well and he has the means to hurt us. We will no doubt have to go underground to be able to continue to fight against the system. With Alvaro Garcia in it, a MAS government would undoubtedly be our enemy.

How do you explain that Alvaro Garcia, who was for so long your comrade in the struggle, is advocating in the programme of the MAS an “Andean capitalism”, whereas you yourself are taking more and more anti-capitalist positions?

Once again, Alvaro Garcia is a White, he is not indigenous. His proposal is totally foreign to our movement. The indigenous peoples are not capitalist; on the contrary they have been victims of capitalism for centuries. We are communitarians. Any practical implementation of Andean capitalism is doomed to failure.

Bolivia
“The MAS is of the Centre-Left”

Interview with Álvaro García Linera, newly elected Bolivian vice-president

Pablo Stefanoni

Sociologist, political analyst, very much present in the media, ex-leader of the Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army (EGTK) along with Felipe Quispe at the beginning of the 1990s, Álvaro García Linera is the newly elected vice-president of Bolivia.

In the eyes of some observers, he is the MAS’s “trump card” for winning over the “urban middle classes”, thanks to his profile as an intellectual. For others, he is just an “ex-terrorist”; for still others, he is the person who can be a moderating influence on Morales. He did this interview with Pablo Stefanoni for Inprecor, our French-language sister journal.

What difficulties emerged during the negotiations with the other components of the Left?

From a programmatic point of view, there is a consensus, from the most moderate to the most radical, on the demands that should be put forward. We were quickly able to reach agreement on a common platform of reforms: nationalization of hydrocarbons, a Constituent Assembly and a new economic model. Where the difficulties appeared was when the time came to discuss list of candidates. However, there are some principles which seem to me to be essential.

First of all, the respect for the territorial representativeness of the organizations, which is after all an original way to build a social network of electoral mobilization. There is a general

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[1] The United Union Confederation of Working Peasants of Bolivia (CSUTCB), led by Felipe Quispe since 1998, suffered a split on the initiative of members of the MAS at its Congress in Sucre in June 2003. Convoked by a majority of departments on the grounds of non-respect of the statutes by its leader, Felipe Quispe refused to attend, as did the local leaders from La Paz and Tarija. That is why there now exist two peasant confederations, one led by Quispe and under the influence of the MIP, the other, which has the majority, led by a MAS senator, Roman Loayza.

[2] Chapare is the bastion of the coca growers led by Evo Morales.

[3] Achacachi is the stronghold of the MIP.

[4] Alejo Veliz was a leader who was in competition with Evo Morales during the 1990s. He is at present a member of parliament for the New Republican Force (NFR).
acceptance of the principle that consists of leaving each organisation a form of sovereignty in choosing its candidates, and that enabled us to make quick progress.

It is a logic that is very different from the one that governed the previous left fronts between parties. But since, in certain territories, several organisations are superposed, for example in El Alto, it is necessary to achieve a fair balance. And that is where the difficulties appeared.

**Did the Bolivian Workers Confederation (COB) want well-placed candidates in return for allying with the MAS?**

Alvaro Garcia Linera: All the organisations want that, the COB the same as the others.

**Did Jaime Solares want to lead the alliance along with Evo Morales?**

Solares wanted the COB to be at the centre of the initiative, for it to be the entity that coordinated the other movements, and I think that in the period we are living through, no social movement can attribute to itself such prerogatives, because there is no longer a national movement in Bolivia. All the social movements, today, are regional and local movements. There exists in the COB a kind of melancholy, but we are not dealing with the COB of the 1970s.

**Where do you situate the MAS from an ideological point of view?**

I would situate it on the centre-left, because the project of economic and social transformations that this organisation wants to carry through cannot be described as either communist or socialist or even ‘communitarist’ [a reference to the indigenous communities as units of economic and social production - translator’s note].

**Is it your thesis that socialism is not viable in Bolivia today?** There are two reasons why there is not much chance of a socialist regime being installed in Bolivia. On the one hand, there is a proletariat that is numerically in a minority and politically non-existent, and you cannot build socialism without a proletariat.

Secondly, the potential for agrarian and urban communities is very much weakened. There is an implosion of community economies into family structures, which have been the framework within which the social movements have arisen. In Bolivia, 70 per cent of workers in the cities work in family-based economic structures, and you do not build socialism on the basis of a family economy.

**In that case, what kind of system does the MAS want to build?**

A kind of Andean capitalism. **What is Andean capitalism?**

It is a question of building a strong state, which can coordinate in a balanced way the three “economico-productive” platforms that coexist in Bolivia: the community-based, the family-based and the “modern industrial”.

It is a question of transferring a part of the surplus of the nationalised hydrocarbons [oil and gas] in order to encourage the setting up of forms of self-organisation, of self-management and of commercial development that is really Andean and Amazonian.

Up to now, these traditional sectors have not been able to develop because of a “modern-industrial” sector that has cornered the surpluses. Our idea is that these traditional sectors should have an economic support, should have access to raw materials and markets, which could then generate prosperity within these artisan and family-based processes. Bolivia will still be capitalist in 50 or 100 years.

**Don’t you consider that the movements in defence of water in Cochabamba and El Alto are forms of community-type experiences?**

They are community experiences socially and economically, but not politically. They are a dramatic expression of the communitarist limits of the present social movement, for example in the domain of the management of new enterprises. But in any case, these experiences enable us to conceive of a political revolution, in the Marxist sense of the term, which in the case of Bolivia corresponds to the decolonisation of the state.

**What differences are there between today’s candidate of the MAS and the leader of the EGTK?**

There is a line of continuity and a line of rupture. The continuity lies in the conviction that I have, that the indigenous peoples must govern Bolivia, and that this is the only way to overcome the fault line that has existed for 180 years between society and the state, and to end the colonial character of the Republic, which affects just as much the state institutions as the private lives of Bolivians.

The difference lies in the means: fifteen years ago, we thought that it could come about through an armed uprising of the communities. Today, we think that it is an objective that we can attain through a great electoral triumph. The means change, but the objectives remain the same.

**What are your principal theoretical and ideological influences?**

I will mention five writers. Two classical writers have contributed to my education. They are Marx, but the Marx of Capital, not the Marx of the manuals [the training manuals of the communist parties] and Max Weber. Reading him led me to become interested in the role of the symbolic in political struggles. Another decisive influence in my intellectual formation is undoubtedly Pierre Bourdieu, from whom I inherit my way of analysing fields, relationships of forces in struggles. And I would cite two classical Bolivian writers: Fausto Reinaga and Rene Zavaleta.

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**NOTES**

[1] Fausto Reinaga was the fundamental thinker of “Indianism”. Rene Zavaleta could be described as a Marxist revolutionary nationalist.
Bolivia

Historic Victory of the MAS and Morales

Latest update from our Bolivian correspondent

Herve do Alto

On Sunday December 18th, in a historic victory, Evo Morales, candidate of the left-wing MAS, became the first indigenous president in Bolivia’s 180-year history. “We ourselves were surprised by the scale of our victory. I am moved, and I thank all the social movements, all those who have fought to recover our natural resources, those who have fought for our rights, those who have fought to change the course of history in Bolivia”.

These were the first words, on Sunday evening, of the new Bolivian president, Evo Morales. Someone who in the course of his life has been a lama breeder, a trumpet player and a coca grower, became, on this 18th of December, the first indigenous person to accede to the office of President of the Republic in the whole of Latin America.

The calm that reigned in the streets of La Paz and El Alto was somewhat deceptive. Because on this Sunday the 18th of December, it really is a historic evening that the Bolivian people are living through.

The unexpected landslide in favour of the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) enabled its leader, Evo Morales, to obtain a score of 51 per cent.

This unprecedented result also puts an end to twenty years of “pact democracy”: the election of presidents on an indirect second round in Congress, and the obligation to obtain there an absolute majority, had systematically favoured governmental alliances between neo-liberal parties in the course of the short history of Bolivian democracy.

With a result like that, the MAS is thus sure of being able to govern alone. But that doesn’t mean that governing will be an easy thing to do. The Right is in a rout, but for all that it is not definitively beaten.

Certainly, the distance between Morales and his presidential rivals is enormous, and the defeat that it represents for them could very well mean their withdrawal from political life. Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga, the candidate of the alliance of the liberal Right Democratic and Social Power (PODEMOS), received 31 per cent of the vote, a result that is only a reflection of the polarization that Quiroga fomented throughout the campaign.

The centre-right candidate Samuel Doria Medina, of National Unity (UN), seen as a potential winner in August, won in fact only 8 per cent of the vote. For Quiroga and for Doria Medina, the defeat of the Right is above all their defeat, and their credibility is seriously damaged.

The only good news in the camp of the “neo-liberals” is the surprising “survival” of the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR), which was however identified as mainly responsible for the massacres that took place during the first “gas war” in October 2003.

With a candidate who was virtually a political unknown, the son of Japanese immigrants Michiaki Nagatani, the MNR won 7 per cent of the vote thanks in particular to a significant mobilization of its historic bastions, such as the department of Beni.

However, these results only appear to be a total defeat, inasmuch as the Right could still have the possibility of “blocking” initiatives of the future Masista government. In reality the MAS only has a relative majority in the Chamber of Deputies. [1] The MNR, with one senator, gives the majority to the neo-liberal and conservative camp.

Finally, the prefectoral elections, which also took place this Sunday, only seem to have given two or maybe three departmental governments to the MAS (Oruro, Potosí and Chuquisaca), the others falling into the hands of the Right. That means that the room for manoeuvre of the future government could be very limited at the regional level, as witness the victory in Santa Cruz of a radical supporter of regional autonomy, Ruben Costas. “Now, Evo must respect his promises”. That is how a militant of the MAS put it in El Alto on Sunday evening. A lot of pressure is coming from the “base” of the party itself, and the newly elected parliamentarians, like Maria Esther Urueta, stressed the importance of “maintaining a permanent dialogue with all the social movements”, whether or not they are members of the MAS.

Expectations are high, in particular concerning the nationalization of hydrocarbons and the election of a Constituent Assembly in August 2006, and it is very likely that the first days of the government will be marked by the adoption of symbolic measures. Thus, for Julio Colque, a former union activist in the mines, “the goal is to put an end to the neo-liberal model and economic globalization.

To do that, we have to do away with decree 21060 [a decree promulgated in 1985, which made it possible to privatize state enterprises] which is nothing but a Trojan horse for it”. For Evo Morales himself, who was speaking from Cochabamba this Sunday, the struggle is not only economic. “The election of an indigenous person to the head of the Republic will only be of use if it makes it possible to put an end to the colonial state in which we live, and for this new state to be a point of support in the struggle against all forms of racism”.

The election of Evo Morales represents an important turning point not only for Bolivia, but for the whole of the Latin American continent. According to Morales, “we are in the third millennium, the millennium of the peoples, and no longer of the Empire. Our victory is also the victory of peoples in struggle”.


For Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, “the Bolivians have written anew page of their history (...) making it possible to envisage the end of poverty and to enter on the road of development”. There is no doubt that the arrival of Morales at the head of the Bolivian state potentially represents a strong reinforcement for Chavez’s project of the Bolivarian Alternative of the Americas (ALBA), which for the moment only formally involves Venezuela and Cuba.

On the other hand, many questions remain concerning the attitude that the United States will adopt towards the future MAS government. For the moment, although the United States embassy has up to now maintained a cautious attitude, the declarations of the embassy has up to now maintained a moment, although the United States will adopt towards the remain concerning the attitude that the involves Venezuela and Cuba.

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Now, we are the main donors of aid to Bolivia, and if the government of this country is hostile to individual freedoms, to human rights and to civil rights, the United States will not be able to continue doing that”. Quite obviously, the first days of this future government, which comes from the popular and indigenous movements of Bolivia, are likely to be eventful.

Bolivia

“If Evo doesn’t nationalize the gas, he will fall like Lozada”

Interview with Jaime Solares, leader of the COB. Interview by Herve do Alto.

Permanently confronted by serious accusations concerning his past, the polemical executive secretary of the Bolivian Workers Confederation (COB), Jaime Solares, has, whatever might be said about him, the merit of having put the union confederation back in the centre of the social stage, since the first “gas war” of October 2003. On the occasion of these elections, he was for a long time envisaged as candidate for the vice-presidency for the Pachakuti Indigenous Movement (MIP) of Felipe Quispe, before renouncing the idea a few days before the closing date for nominations.

Felipe Quispe invited you on to his list as candidate for the vice-presidency, which you finally refused. Why?

What Felipe wanted was to appropriate the name of the COB. He didn’t want me to come in my own name. That was a kind of condition for my participation. Now the COB cannot act like a political party, it’s an instrument in the service of the workers and we cannot commit it as such. That’s why I refused.

Alvaro Garcia has revealed that negotiations had taken place between the COB and the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) with a view to a possible alliance. For your part, you have remained very discreet on the subject...

You have to understand that for ten years, Evo Morales as well as Felipe Quispe have no longer been concerned by the fact that the working class is the vanguard of the proletariat. They would like to lead the COB, but they can’t because it’s called the Bolivian Workers’ Confederation. But they are only leaders of the countryside and so they can’t claim to lead it.

The COB was created as an organ of the proletariat, whose objective is to defend the workers of this country. Evo, Felipe and now even Alvaro Garcia say: “The COB is now just a small movement with a big history”. As far as I’m concerned, I think they are making a big mistake, because the working class remains an important social force in the country, even if we are not as numerous as in the past.

So we are not with any political party and we won’t support anybody. We don’t want to bear the responsibility of having supported a government that will attack the workers tomorrow, even if it’s a government of the MAS.

How exactly do you analyse the possibility of an indigenous government coming to power?

If Evo comes to power, he will have difficulties, faced with a tough Right, because he is not a revolutionary but a reformist. If he was a revolutionary, we would be with him. But his perspective is not one of a worker-peasant government working for the revolution.

So we want to maintain a position of observers in relation to an indigenous government, to see how it will evolve. It is obvious that if Evo doesn’t nationalize the gas and the hydrocarbons, he will fall like Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada [1]. On the other hand, we will not obstruct the action of a government which satisfies the demands of the people, even though we may stand aside from it.

Is it the breaking of the Pact of Revolutionary Unity of March 2005 that is the cause of this situation?

In March, we committed ourselves before the people to proceed to nationalize hydrocarbons, without compensation for the oil companies. When the MAS demonstrated in May, it was not around the workers and we cannot commit it as such. That’s why I refused.

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this demand but for a modification of the law on hydrocarbons that did not call into question the illegal contracts linking the state to the oil companies. Subsequently, it was the first to defend the idea that the only way out of the crisis in June was through elections, whereas what was really at stake was the gas!

It was a betrayal, because he did not respect the pact. He did not want this nationalization. The proof of it is that in the course of his campaign, he had already explained that he would not expel any oil company. Now, what we agreed on was a programme with a revolutionary orientation. And he, like the good reformist he is, is finally proposing to cohabit with private foreign capital.

**Today, many unions belonging to the COB have allied as such with the MAS for these elections. What is the impact of that at the trade union level?**

Each person knows what they are doing. Within the COB, we have a line and we will maintain it. If there are trade unionists who want to support this or that party, it’s their problem, not ours. The COB cannot ally with the MAS.

**What are the relations between the two CSUTCBs and the COB today?**

For us the leader of the CSUTCB is Felipe Quispe. Evo has nothing to do with us. Quispe has an organic relationship with the COB. Roman Loayza has never done anything on this level. He has always devoted more of his life to his party than to his union responsibilities.

**There has been talk for some time of establishing the COB’s own political instrument...**

This instrument has already existed for several months already, following a decision taken during a general assembly of the COB. It represents the political arm of the COB in order to take power and its provisional name is “political instrument of the workers”. Our political work will consist of consolidating this instrument around a revolutionary programme based on the nationalisation of hydrocarbons without compensation and the establishment of a revolutionary and indigenous Constituent Assembly where representation will be through organisations and not constituencies, which would be an approach in conformity with the bourgeois parliamentary model. It will also be necessary to reinforce the Indigenous Popular Assembly [2] that came out of the May-June crisis, as a form of popular self-organisation that will make it possible to lay the foundations of a worker-peasant revolution of a socialist character.

**Wouldn’t a better coordination of the workers and peasant movement be achieved through a more realistic representation of the peasants within the COB?**

Yes, that’s the argument of the MAS for taking power within the COB! Because the present statutes indicate that the vanguard of the proletariat is the miners, and we must maintain that because our organisation is a workers’ confederation. The United Union Confederation of Woking Peasants of Bolivia (CSUTCB), as far as I know, doesn’t mention workers! They are the proprietors of their confederation and they are our allies.

**What is at stake in the Workers’ and Peoples’ Summit in January and the COB congress in February?**

The Summit will have, among other things, the function of preparing the congress of the COB. What is at stake in this congress is to confront the divisions that affect many sectors: the peasants, the miners, the oil workers, the departmental confederation in Cochabamba, where Oscar Olivera [3] has been ousted from the executive committee.

It will also be a question of discussing the attitude of certain unions who collaborate with the employers. It is the “class struggle orientation of our confederation. The COB no longer sells itself to successive governments, as it did in the past. Today the COB is poor, but it is honest.

**Certain media accuse you of having called for a military coup d’etat during the May-June crisis. Can you clarify what your position was?**

Ninety-eight per cent of the media here belong to private groups, which have deformed what I said as much as they could. I never called on soldiers to carry out a coup d’état. I simply said that if a soldier who was patriotic and committed to the people, like Chavez in Venezuela, took power in Bolivia, I would be the first to support him, to end social injustice and dire poverty. All that is nothing but a campaign of slander against me, which Evo Morales has an unfortunate tendency to repeat.

For some people, there is a kind of coherence between such an attitude and the suspicions that hang over your so-called past as a paramilitary working for the regime of general Luis Garcia Meza... [5].

This campaign of slander that is conducted against me serves the interests of imperialism and all its lackeys in Bolivia. Luis Garcia Meza, who is today imprisoned in Chonchocororo, says that he remembers me. But he obviously has a selective memory, because when he is asked where he buried the victims of his regime, he says he cannot remember, not even in the case of Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz [6].

Several sources affirm that 10,000 dollars was given to Garcia Meza to formulate these accusations against me. When he said that for the first time, the prison authorities and the press put on a real media show.

It is a real manipulation whose only aim is to put me out of action. All those who know me laughed on hearing the news. As for my comrades in the COB, up to now they are supporting me in spite of the slanders, because I defend a correct line for the workers.

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**NOTES**

[1] Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, known as “Goni”, was the President of the Republic who was forced to resign during the first “gas war” in October 2003.

[2] In El Alto, such a Popular Assembly came into being at the beginning of June 2005, called by the COB, the COR and the FEJUV. Its appeal was then taken up by the Coordination in Cochabamba, which set up a similar structure. However these embryonic forms of popular power remained largely on paper and were limited to a coordination of the leaders of the principal social movements.

[3] Oscar Olivera was one of the leaders of the “water war” in 2000.

[4] The executive secretary of the COD of Santa Cruz, Gabriel Helbing, is a candidate on the lists of the right-wing coalition PODemos in Santa Cruz.

[5] Since the election of Jaime Solares to lead the COB, at its 13th Congress in August 2003, he has been regularly attacked by the press and by his opponents. According to several journalists, Solares was a paramilitary working for the political police of the military regimes, the DOP (Department of Public Order) at the end of the 1970s, and he did this work for six years, while he was employed in the Mining Police (which is responsible for preventing the theft of raw materials and tools) in the Hunani mine. Up now Solares has always denied these accusations.

[6] Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz, leader of the Socialist Party and historic leader of the Bolivian Left, the circumstances of whose assassination have to this day not been cleared up.
Bolivia

Electoral polarization and crisis of the state

Pablo Stefanoni

June 9th, 2005, saw the conclusion of the acute political crisis which put an early end to the government of Carlos Mesa (2003-2005). Mesa himself had succeeded Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, driven from power by a popular uprising, the bloody repression of which led to the deaths of 60 people in October 2003 [1].

A parliamentary agreement then enabled the president of the Supreme Court of Justice, Eduardo Rodriguez Veltze, to become President of the Republic. This political agreement was the origin of the calling of early general elections for December 18th 2005 [2], and included the convoking of a Constituent Assembly and the holding of a referendum on departmental autonomy in July 2006.

By this agreement, it was intended to put an end by electoral means to the “catastrophic equality” that has lasted for five years now between conservative and progressive forces, five years in the course of which neither the indigenous-popular leaders of the West (neo-nationalists) nor the leaders who come from the private sector of the East (neo-liberals) succeeded in imposing their project of society, each of them settling for putting in check the project of the opposing camp.

In the course of these years of political crisis and social convulsions, Bolivian political life has been marked by the emergence onto the national political stage of peasant and indigenous movements, as well as by the politicization of ethnicity as an element of self-expression of the popular sectors, particularly in the context of the weakening of traditional class identity, which, in the case of Bolivia, was rooted in the mines (to such an extent that some people spoke of a “miners’ Marxism”). However, this “ethnic” construction of the people was associated with a - selective - re-appropriation of the old lines of cleavage that were characteristic of the revolutionary nationalism of the 1950s which, once the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) went into crisis at the beginning of the 21st century, remained “available”. Among these cleavages is the classical antagonism between the “nation” and the “anti-nation”.

The Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) is the force that has best succeeded in taking advantage of the deep crisis of the traditional parties which have administered the neo-liberal model since 1985. It is a “New Left”, distant from the traditional Left, both on the level of its discourse and from the point of view of its organisational structure, much more comparable to a “confederation of unions” than to a classical left party.

Today, its candidate for the presidency, Evo Morales, is riding high in the opinion polls, in a context of polarisation with the right-wing coalition, Democratic and Social Power (PODEMOS), led by ex-President Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga, who is stubbornly waging a “dirty war” of rare intensity against the Left, playing on the fear of “the country being isolated” in the event of a victory of Morales.

This polarisation is condemning Samuel Doria Medina, who is in the cement business, to third place, in spite of his repeated attempts to come across as the representative of a “rational centre”, faced with a Left and a Right whose actions are portrayed as contrary to the interests of the country.

For its part, the MNR, still led by Sanchez de Lozada from Washington, has put its money on a virtually unknown son of Japanese immigrants, Michiaki Nagatani, to try and at least reach the threshold of 5 per cent of the vote. An objective that is very far from the traditional results of this party, which controlled, for more than half a century, the political life of the country.

Despite the scale of the anti-neoliberal social mobilisations, the Right is weakened, but not beaten, which means that a left government must not expect to be navigating in calm waters. According to the same polls which make Evo the future president of Bolivia, the Right would control the Senate and almost all the prefectures [3], in a context where there are demands for autonomy in two strategic regions of the country: Santa Cruz de la Sierra (in the East) and Tarija (in the South), two departments where the principal reserves of gas and oil are concentrated.

Two “agendas” were imposed in the course of the crisis that began in 2003: the “October agenda”, whose objectives
are the nationalisation of hydrocarbons and the calling of a Constituent Assembly, and which is defended by the social movements, and which is carried by the civic committees [4] of Santa Cruz and Tarija.

The nationalisation of gas
The product of social pressure - in a climate that is ever more nationalist - the new law on hydrocarbons was adopted in June 2005. This law increases the taxes that the oil companies have to pay [5], enables the state to get back the ownership of the hydrocarbons “on the surface” and promotes the “re-founding” of the national oil company (YPFB). A year before, in July 2004, Bolivians voted massively in a referendum in favour of more state regulation of the oil industry.

And during the crisis of May-June 2005, the social wave that was favourable to nationalisation spread to the whole country, thus canalising a series of accumulated frustrations, associated with the desire to put an end to the permanent pillage of the country’s natural resources by the multinationals, who only left crumbs, and this in midst of an ocean of hardship and of chronic poverty.

The majority of Bolivians see the regaining of the income from oil as the “last chance” for the country to take off economically and to accede to a socially inclusive modernisation.

However, in spite of the “moderation” of the juridical norm that was finally adopted, and at a moment when the demands for nationalisation of the exploitation and management of oil were stronger and stronger, the oil companies, the international institutions and the multilateral credit organisms nevertheless opposed these new juridical dispositions, considered as “confiscatory”.

The pressures that resulted - which included, for example, threats of judgements by arbitration tribunals, judgments that were made possible by investment protection agreements - have succeeded up to now in preventing the signature of any new contract between the Bolivian state and the multinational enterprises who profit from this new system of exploitation (however the law established a delay of 180 days for the conclusion of these new contracts).

The demands concerning autonomy
To the demands for nationalisation have been added the demands for departmental autonomy, formulated essentially by the elites of Santa Cruz, elites who nevertheless enjoy broad support among the population.

The inhabitants of Santa Cruz have already obtained the election of prefects by universal suffrage, at the same time as the general elections of December 18th [6], and also succeeded in rallying behind them the departments of Beni, Pando and Tarija.

The Civic Committee - which includes within it a strong business component, but which is nonetheless considered by the population as representative - gained legitimacy for its demands thanks to a massive general assembly organised in January 2005 (which mobilised more than 200,000 people), as well as by a petition carrying 300,000 signatures recognised by the National Electoral Court (CNE), whose aim was to demand the convocation of a referendum on autonomy by citizens’ initiative.

Many people make the point that during the neo-liberal era, the elites of Santa Cruz controlled the strategic places in the state apparatus (among others, the National Institute of Agrarian Reform), operating directly from La Paz to take advantage of public policies that were favourable to their interests, policies such as the abolition of debts.

Today, these same elites are afraid that the coming Constituent Assembly and a possible triumph of the MAS would lead to the scenario of the “revenge of the indigenous”, which would put on the table a certain number of sensitive subjects such as land ownership (in a region where ownership of land is strongly concentrated in the hands of a handful of people). For this reason, the demand for autonomy can be understood as taking refuge on the “local level”, so as to protect the region from the conflicts that are taking place at national level, and from the potential economic and social transformations that a triumph of the MAS on 18th December could lead to.

Since the 1960s, the economy of the region of Santa Cruz has seen its contribution to Bolivia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increase constantly and today, its economic activity seems more dynamic, more technically efficient, and more open to business and trade, than that of other regions of the country. This economy is characterised by a particularly important service sector and mining and agro-export activities (in the case of soja, for example).

The sociologist and MAS candidate for the vice-presidency, Alvaro Garcia Linera, notes that in recent decades, “the rising economic power has shifted from the West to the East, but the power of socio-economic mobilisation has been reinforced in the West, thus giving rise to a new geographical uncertainty in the country”. And he concludes that “whereas in the West discursive constructions have emerged which have associated the economic crisis with neo-liberalism, in the East - where the hegemony of a business culture has continued - the difficulties have been associated with La Paz centralism and not with the economic model”.

We should add to this that openly racist attitudes, such as the attacks of the Youth Union of Santa Cruz to prevent, by wielding clubs, a peasant demonstration from entering the city in June 2005, have turned regional cleavages into cleavages that are also ethnic, in the absence of national leaderships that are capable of giving expression to the ethnic and social diversity that are, however, constitutive of this Andean-Amazonian nation.

Towards a “Venezuelanisation” of Bolivia?
A few days away from the December 18th elections, it seems obvious that the fall of the neo-liberal ancien regime has allowed some key ideas, of a nationalist bent, to be expressed, but without however engendering a new national hegemony. The “counter-hegemonic” camp finds itself today accidentally associated with the MAS, but is having great difficulty in imagining a “post-liberal” scenario.

The post-electoral panorama - with a possible triumph of the Right in at least five of the nine departments - underlines the geographical limits of the present cycle of political renovation of the country. Quiroga was sharply criticised when presented his lists of candidates for the Assembly and the Senate, which were immediately seen as a “machine for recycling” the old, discredited traditional politicians. Despite that, the candidacy of the conservative ex-President - who is curiously using a red star as his logo - is condensing the “anti-Evo” and “anti-blockade” vote.

A vote that regroups not only the elites who are reticent to lose the power they have enjoyed since the foundation of the Republic, but also sectors from the middle, and even popular, classes, who are afraid of seeing an indigenous “illiterate” receive the tricolour scarf and the commander’s baton which symbolise the power of the head of the Bolivian state. Others fear that the aid coming from international cooperation will be suppressed, whereas it has become a vital resource for the economic stability of the country, because of the rickety state that public finances are in today.

In relation to this conjuncture, the challenges that the MAS has to confront are considerable: first of all it has to win the elections, then to guarantee that the country can be governed. Several analysts underline the potential dangers that a government headed by the
indigenous Left could encounter, in the event of a “Venezuelanisation” of Bolivia: a coming together of possible sabotage on the part of local elites from the private sector and operations of destabilisation organised by a United States diplomacy that distrusts Morales, who is in the habit of saying that Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez are “the commanders of the liberation forces of the continent”.

Demonstrating an exemplary lucidity, the leader of the MAS has remarked on this subject “that it is a question not only of succeeding in forming a government, but of taking power”.

► Pablo Stefanoni is a Bolivian journalist and researcher in social sciences.

NOTES

[1] What has become known as the “gas war”, against the exporting of this raw material via Chilean ports (during the Pacific War of 1879, Chile annexed the Bolivian seacoast) had a macabre balance sheet of 60 dead and around a hundred wounded.
[2] The confrontation between regions over the number of seats in parliament that corresponded to their population (in line with the 2001 census), led to the postponing of the elections from the initial date of December 4th to December 18th.
[3] The prefectures are the departmental governments.
[4] The Civic Committee includes the “living forces”, which are the union organisations and the business groups, the latter having, in these two regions, a preponderant political weight. In Tarija and in Santa Cruz, the civic committees are considered by some of their members as the “moral government” and as legitimate in these regions.
[5] The new law instituted the Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons (IDH), which enables the state to recover 32 per cent of the profits produced by the exploitation of oil. This 32 per cent is to be added to the 18 per cent of royalties which the Bolivian state received up till then, which means that it recovers a total of 50 per cent of overall profits.
[6] The prefects were previously appointed by the President of the Republic. Elected, they will have increased legitimacy...
[7] The director of the Centre of Juridical Research and Research in Social Sciences (CEJIS), Carlos Romero, explains that “since the 1960s and 1970s, Santa Cruz benefited from a substantial transfer of the mining surplus of Oruro and Potosí through the central government, via credits, the building of agricultural complexes, roads, etc.” He also affirms that “rather than being marginalised, Santa Cruz has been privileged, with surpluses that have enabled it to integrate into the export market. That is why the arguments about ‘andinocentrism’ should be relativised.”
**News from around the world**

**Iran**

**Defend Iranian Workers**

**The Rulings Issued by Iranian Courts Against Labour Movement Activists Must be Revoked**

The courts of the government of Iran have sentenced a number of prominent labour movement activists to several years in prison, to be followed for some of them with exile. Their only “crime” is the attempt to hold a celebration event on May Day 2004.

These workers were arrested at the gathering for International Workers’ Day on May 1, 2004 at the Children’s Park in the city of Saqiz, and sent to the dungeons. According to the rulings issued by the courts, Mahmud Salehi, the spokesman for the Coordinating Committee for the Creation of a Workers’ Organization has been sentenced to 5 years in prison and 2 years in exile. Jalal Husseini has been sentenced to 3 years in prison. Mohsen Hakimi, Muhammad Abdipur and Borhan Divargar, other prominent figures in the workers’ movement, have been sentenced to 2 years in prison each.

We the undersigned, who have consistently stood in defence of Iranian sovereignty against foreign imperial aggression and pressures, strongly condemn these undemocratic and unjust rulings of Iranian courts and demand an unconditional revocation of all the rulings and the immediate release of all the detainees.

Please send Signatures (name, country, profession) to the following email address:
Komiteye_hamahangi@yahoo.com

Website of the Committee:
http://www.komiteyehamahangi.com/

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**Venezuela**

**In Defence of Democracy**

Intellectuals and personalities worldwide call for defence of Venezuelan democracy, as Washington-inspired opposition boycott of National Assembly elections leads to pro-Chavez walkover.

For the past six years we have witnessed how, in the midst of great adversity, millions of Venezuelans have taken their destiny into their own hands and worked together to achieve the construction of a society rooted in the values of solidarity, democracy and social justice.

Strengthened by the Bolivarian Constitution –one of the most democratic in the world- the Venezuelan People have ratified this project in seven elections over the past six years.

Nevertheless, an elite sector of society, with the support of the U.S. government and Venezuela’s private media, has repeatedly tried to derail Venezuela’s democratic process. They attempted a coup d’Etat in April 2002, that was reversed by the People of Venezuela who took to the streets armed only with their Constitution. In December 2002 they tried to sabotage the country’s oil industry, and succeeded in deeply damaging the Venezuelan economy. But the Venezuelan people, organized within their communities, once again prevailed.

Today, on the eve of the December 4th legislative elections, the minority opposition in Venezuela, unwilling to face a new political defeat, have cynically called for the withdrawal of its candidates claiming lack of confidence in Venezuela’s electoral authorities.

Despite the fact that recent elections in Venezuela have been characterized by an unprecedented level of transparency, attested repeatedly by international observers, the opposition conditioned its participation in the legislative elections on a new series of demands.

However, once these demands were agreed to by the electoral authorities, the opposition abandoned its original commitment and withdrew from the elections with the goal of delegitimizing Venezuela’s institutions.

This cynical move demonstrates once again that the Venezuelan opposition is prepared to undermine democracy and violate a people’s sovereign right to self-determination in its desperate gambit for power.

This new attempt to disrupt Venezuela’s democratic process has been tacitly supported by U.S. government officials who have publicly questioned the credibility of Venezuela’s electoral authorities.

We, friends of the Venezuelan people, reject this new attempt to sabotage democracy. We place our trust in Venezuela’s electoral authorities and in the Venezuelan people’s will to defend their right to vote.

First signatures:
João Pedro Stedile (Brazil)
Emir Sader (Brazil)
Jose Dirceu (Brazil)
Alain Krivine (France)
Eduardo Galeano (Uruguay)

Pro-Chavez demonstrators call for everyone to vote

Bernard Cassen (France)
James Petras (USA)
Olivier Besancenot (France)
Ignacio Ramonet (Spain)
Tariq Ali (Pakistan)
Atilio Borón (Argentina)
Samir Amin (Egypt)
Francois Houtart (Belgium)
Richard Gott (UK)
Rossaeline Vachetta (France)
Fernando Morais (Brazil)
Jean-Pierre Chevenement (France)
Georges Sarre (France)
Sergio Lobo (Venezuela)
Robin Blackburn (UK)
Socorro Gomes (Brazil)
Vanessa Grazziotin (Brazil)
Carlos Lima (Brazil)
Sydney Liberal (Brazil)
Paul-Emile Dupret (Belgium)
Rémy Herrera (France)
Valter Pomar (Brazil)
Ramón Chao (Spain)
Aminata Traore (Mali)
Michael Löwy (Brazil)
Leila Jinkings (Brazil)

To add your name please send an e-mail to defensavenezuela@yahoo.com
Pakistan

LPP organises 5000 strong anti-WTO rally

Farooq Tariq

Thousands of Labour Party Pakistan activists demonstrated today (Tuesday 6 December) in Lahore against the imperialist onslaught of privatization and the WTO.

The rally participated in by trade union activists and political workers, started from Shimla Hill and culminated at Lahore Station.

The charged participants were raising slogans against US imperialism, military dictatorship, privatization, brick kiln bosses and WTO.

In a statement on the occasion, the LPP chairperson Nisar Shah and general secretary Farooq Tariq said that the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations are dominated by rich countries and their corporate lobbying groups thus the process of negotiations is not producing any fruitful results for developing countries. The process is also un-democratic and non-transparent; all the key decisions are being taken in small group meetings influenced by rich countries like USA and European Union.

Thus looking into the experience of ten years of WTO negotiations, we demand from developing countries and civil society to derail the sixth WTO ministerial conference in Hong Kong.

The rally was also addressed by Furrukh Sohail Goindi, information secretary PPP (SB), Mehmood Butt of Pakistan Bhatta Mazdoor Union, Azza Shad of Women Workers Helpline, Mian Qayyum of Labour Qoumi Movement, and a number of other trade union leaders.

The rally was supported by the National Trade Union Federation, Women Workers Helpline, Pakistan Bhatta Mazdoor Union and Progressive Youth Front.

Addressing the rally, LPP leaders said that LPP considers the WTO as an unbalanced agreement as it favours rich countries and trans-national corporations.

Earlier, a press statement, jointly issued by LPP executive committee, stated:

“This institution has been created to protect the expanded interests of global capitalism rather than poor people. In line with World Bank, IMF and Asian Development Bank, WTO is also a global institute of capitalism. The very fundamentals of capitalism are based on exploitation of labour and poor, so there is no chance that these institutions can be reformed in favour of poor. There is urgent need to seriously think for dismantling the institutions of global capitalism, among which WTO is one. The Labour Party Pakistan leaders said that looking into the history of WTO negotiations, the Doha round provided an opportunity to change the rules of game, which seems so far, has been wasted. Rich countries promised practical measures to achieve a fairer distribution of benefits of the increasing global trade. Four years later, nothing substantial has been achieved. Trade barriers remained intact, agriculture subsidies have been increased and protected under several heads, and rich countries have progressively pursued rules on investment, services and intellectual property that threaten to reinforce global inequalities.

All the agreements which countries have to abide during the Uruguay round of negotiations were unbalanced and tilted toward rich countries. During the period of Uruguay round the developing countries either don’t have much technical capacity or they were unaware from the tools of imperialism and they were forced to sign the WTO deal in 1994 as a single undertaking. Thus it is evident that all those were made by the rich countries to penetrate in the markets of development countries and exploit their resources.

“The current round offers nothing to poor countries and especially the poor segments of the society. The elite of the poor countries has been co-opted with the agents of the international capitalism and both are exploiting the poor for the benefit of few rich people. It will be waste of time to expect the good from these institutions, thus the social movements and people from all over the world have to forge an alliance against these institutions and put pressure on their government to protect the rights of poor.

“We appeal to all the civil society groups, political parties, parliament and developing countries to reject the ministerial declaration which has been produced and demand the demolition of the domes of capitalism. The LPP leaders said that the Sixth Ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organization marks the completion of a decade of the neo-liberal global trade regime. This meeting is being organized at Hong Kong, China, as it is a “safe haven” for imperialist capital so that the mobilization of any opposition as happened during the previous ministerial conferences can be effectively prevented.

According the WTO secretariat, the main items in the agenda of this meet are, “Agreements on modalities for trade in agriculture and industrial products and further market opening of trade in services,” It calls for setting a date in this meet for the elimination of export subsidies; trade distorting farm support and a package of ‘equivalent ambition’ for market access. Thus trying open markets in accordance with neo-liberal imperatives is the clear-cut agenda while the vast majority of WTO members, the undeveloped countries under neo-colonial plunder will be put under further pressure in this meet by US and EU measures, these imperialist powers who even now spend about 7 billion dollars on agricultural subsidies have unequivocally declared their unwillingness to reduce same before 2012.

They often resort to a number of tariff and non-tariff barriers against the products of poor countries such as the US; the entire trade in services is a monopoly of imperialist finance capital... The opening of trade in services in the undeveloped countries means bringing it under the hegemony of imperialist capital. Thus the Hong Kong meet of WTO is going to be yet another onslaught on the people of undeveloped countries as well as the proletariat and the oppressed masses of imperialist countries. The US and EU measures have succeeded to break down any resistance, so far shown by the governments of most of the undeveloped countries through intrigues and manoeuvrings so that the WTO dictates sponsored in their interests can get approved this time.

In order to hoodwink the undeveloped countries, this time the WTO secretariat has proposed the formation of an ‘Aid-for-Trade’ initiative envisaging close co-ordination and synchronization of operations between WTO and the World Bank- IMF combine. Besides, unlike previous meets, rhetoric on “poverty-reduction through trade”, “level playing field for developing countries” etc. will also become propaganda themes this time. Thus the Hong Kong meet is going to be an occasion for an all out offensive by imperialist powers for further advancing of the imperialist globalization agenda of neo-colonisation. The balance sheet of three decades of imperialist globalization reveals that consequences of this onslaught through the IMF-WB-WTO trio along with the multi-national companies shall be frightening for the world proletariat and oppressed people
around the world. It shall further intensify their unemployment, pauperization, devastation and thereby their alienation.

Labour Party Pakistan call for uncompromising struggle against the globalization, liberalization, and privatization agenda ruthlessly pursued by the imperialist powers, especially by US imperialism and other imperialist measures through IMF-WB-WTO and MNCs, other imperialist agencies and lackeys by putting forward the revolutionary goal of democratic socialism as the only alternative before mankind.

‘With this world view, we are in hands in hands with all those who are struggling to build and international movement against WTO. We are not in favour of a reformed WTO. The only solution is the derailment of the whole WTO process. We hope that the anti globalization movement at the time of the ministerial meeting would be able to halt the meeting. We show our solidarity with all those who would be in Hong Kong or outside Hong Kong to oppose the WTO unjust agreement. Let us unite to launch a mighty international movement opposing the Hong Kong ministerial conference of the WTO with the orientation of throwing WTO, like other imperialist agencies and institutions along with the imperialist system itself, to the dust-bin of history’.

Farooq Tariq is the general secretary of Labour Party Pakistan.

Publishing

Verso Winter Book Sale

Verso, the leading English language publisher of radical books, is running a stock-clearance booksale, featuring many books of exceptional interest to Marxists at knock-down prices.

Among books of particular interest are:

- **The Legacy of Ernest Mandel**
  Edited by Gilbert Achcar (Hardback: £10/ $US18)
  This work presents a critical appraisal of the vast range of Mandel’s theoretical work. The authors assess his contributions to political and economic theory; his humanist and optimistic variety of Marxism; his crucial contribution to the analysis of the dynamic of capitalism in the late twentieth century; his analyses of the bureaucracy in the workers’ movement; his conception of the problems involved in the transition to socialism; and the specific relationship that a man who came close to perishing in the Nazi concentration camps had to the question of the Holocaust.
  The volume also includes a bibliography of Mandel’s works as well as two previously unpublished pieces by him, one on the Holocaust, the other on the foundations of his unrepentant commitment to Marxism.

- **Marx for Our Times - Adventures and Misadventures of a Critique**
  By Daniel Bensaïd, Translated by Gregory Elliott (Hardback: £10/ $US18).
  Without denying the contradictory character of Marx’s thought, the French philosopher Daniel Bensaïd sets out to demonstrate that it was not a philosophy of the end of history, an empirical sociology of classes, or a positive science of economics positing an inexorable progress towards an ineluctable communism.
  Instead, Marx’s ‘critique of political economy’ encompassed three great critiques of the scientific and political canons of its agehistorical reason, sociological rationality and scientific positivism which make this 19th-century thinker relevant to the 21st century of global capitalism. Indeed, we find here a ‘post-postmodern Marx’ inhabiting a contemporary world replete with contingency, crisis and contradiction.

- **Trotsky as Alternative**
  By Ernest Mandel (Paperback: £5/ $US9)
  Published in English ten years ago, this book summarizes the contribution of Leon Trotsky, from his struggle against Stalinism to his theorization of fascism, the united front and workers democracy. With interesting chapters on Trotsky’s role as a military leader and literary critic.

Other important titles featured include books by:

- Peter Gowan, Mike Davis, Marshall Berman, Benno Teshke, Boris Kagarlitsky, Eric Hobsbawn, Robert Brenner, Michel Aglietta, Dominique Lecourt, Malcolm Bull and many others.
November’s Sri Lanka presidential election was won by prime minister Mahinda Rajapakse, whose election campaign was characterized by his promise to ‘review’ the peace process with the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) and mobilised the majority Sinhala population on a blatantly chauvinist, anti-Tamil agenda. His rival, opposition leader Ranil Wickramasinghe, was more favoured in the West because of his stress on hard line neoliberalism. Both represented an unsavoury choice.

Both capitalist leaders stood for ‘stability’ and ‘peace’, but on different strategies. The aim of both leaders was to satisfy global capital and attract foreign investments. Mahinda Rajapakse wants stability by suppressing the LTTE-led Tamil uprising with a Sinhala chauvinist mobilization. The workers are to be controlled next. He is confident that global Capital could be won over once anti-Tamil stability and peace is achieved.

Ranil Wickramasinghe wanted stability through a ‘federal solution’ to the national problem. He expected the LTTE to come into the mainstream of bourgeois democratic politics through this limited devolution.

Though the votes of ethnic minorities (mainly Tamils) in the South predominantly went to Wickramasinghe, Rajapakse managed to win with a small majority. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) helped him to mobilize the Sinhala chauvinist vote in the South, but they could not get the massive victory they expected.

When compared with 2004 election there was an increase in the right wing opposition United National Party (UNP) votes, closing the gap by several hundred thousands.

In fact it is clear if the careful deleting of Tamil and UNP names from electoral lists could have been contained, that Ranil Wickramasinghe could have won easily in spite of the boycott by the Tamils, in the North. The Tamil boycott was not organised by threats and violence. At least there is no evidence of such activities. The LTTE did not initiate a boycott. The silent campaign was carried out by the youth groups sympathetic to the LTTE. There was resentment among the Tamil youth about the ‘peace process’ itself, given that it has not delivered the Tamil people any benefits.

Probably the thinking behind the northern Tamil boycott was, “Why waste time on this elections putting one Sinhala leaders against the other? Let the Sinhala people decide which agenda they want. Let us prepare for the worst in the meantime”.

Wickramasinghe now complains that the Rajapakse camp blocked thousands in the South through gerrymandering, while the LTTE blocked hundred thousands in the North East through ‘intimidation’. One can understand his disappointment. But the Tamil boycott is, at least partially, self-motivated. People have a democratic right not to participate in elections that are alien to them.

The New Left Front campaign, in which the NSSP was a major force, helped to increase the anti-war vote and some of the benefit of that campaigning probably went to the UNP. But nearly 10,000 people voted for us. Two other left candidates together polled around 66,000 votes. Though there is a dispute about the political nature of the poll, the fact that around 80,000 polled by the entire left is impressive, given the scenario of division of the society on the issue of war and chauvinism. This campaign and vote will help stir the thinking of radical youth and militant workers towards the left and Marxism. Our vote is distributed through out the country, including some predominantly Tamil areas.

The Mahinda Rajapakse regime is a minority regime when we include the Tamils who did not vote. The JVP and JHP both refused to participate in the government. Both can feel the drift of youth.

Obviously they too expect not only militant mobilisations of Tamil youth, but also the struggles of working masses. The chauvinists know that left could gain if they remain with the regime. Rajapakse has declared that he will call an all-party conference before he starts talks with the LTTE. But this is an old story.

Now there is a clear division between those who support devolution of power and who are opposed to it. What is necessary is to bring those who support devolution to get together for a common campaign.

We should expect major political turns in the coming period. Mahinda can get the support of the UNP only if he agrees for a federal solution. But that will throw his best supporters, the JVP and the JHU, on the warpath. At the same time, disillusioned Tamils will increase their attacks and mobilisations.

The only answer Mahinda can give is repression, to use security forces to counter them. Left forces can come together to appeal to the Tamil and Muslim masses to form a third alternative. Can there be a fighting front that includes the left parties with the Tamil and Muslim liberation organizations? Circumstances will eventually force all fighting forces to come together to press for national democratic rights. That will inevitably develop into a struggle for power.

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